Common use of Conclusions and Discussion Clause in Contracts

Conclusions and Discussion. The intention to increase wealth is among the key reasons for conflict – individuals, groups and nation states initiate and escalate predatory attacks on others to appropriate resources, to increase access to precious materials and territories controlled by others, or to benefit otherwise from what neighbors hold and produce. Even the mere anticipation of such predatory attacks can lead individuals, groups, and nation states to introduce a range of preventive measures, from legally-binding contracts to investing in military defense and pre-emptive strikes (Abbink & de Haan, 2014; ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 1978). The inevitable arms-race set in motion by predatory attacks can be excessively costly, reducing (rather than increasing) economic wealth and prosperity in both conflict initiators and responders (▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ et al., 2022). Already in the simple attacker-defender contest studied here, attackers on average lost 20.87% of their original wealth, and defenders 62.63%. Whereas both sides started out equally wealthy, attackers on average earned 111.73% more post-conflict than their defending counterparts. Next to using predatory attacks on others, individuals gain wealth through economic production, including technological innovation and investing in human capital. Individuals, groups, and nation states oftentimes face a tradeoff between investing in ‘peaceful’ economic production and ‘aggressive’ predation on what others have and produce. We modeled such tradeoffs under various cost levels and found that having rather than not having ‘peaceful’ production opportunities can indeed reduce overall conflict, and investment in predatory attacks in particular. We also found that when economic production becomes a more costly way to create wealth, predatory attacks become more rather than less likely. Our results therefore suggest that preventing renewed aggression would not only require opportunities for economic production but also opportunities that are comparatively easy to implement and realize. Indeed, both our model and our experiments revealed that while introducing costly production opportunities reduces the intensity of conflict, it does not eliminate predatory attacks. With the threat of predatory attacks looming, individuals continue to invest in defense and cannot fully focus on ‘peaceful’ creation of wealth through economic production (also see ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 1999). When peace is costly, wasteful conflicts emerge and persist, diminishing wealth and intensifying inequalities. Using recent advances in theory on conflict in general and on asymmetric attacker-defender contests in particular, our findings integrate disparate literatures on the ‘guns versus butter’ tradeoffs that agents make (▇▇▇▇▇▇ & ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2001; ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 1998; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2014) and on when and how natural resources and economic wealth can be a curse rather than blessing (▇▇▇ ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, 2011; ▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2014). Combined, this allows us to conclude, first, that individuals invest in predatory attacks and, consequently, invest even more in defensive protection. Second, our theoretical results suggest that when economic production is a comparatively ‘cheap’ technology for wealth creation, predatory attack loses its appeal and wasteful conflict is reduced. Yet when economic production is comparatively costly, predatory attack gains in appeal and wasteful conflict re-emerges. Third, when peace is costly and conflict increasingly likely, especially those under attack become impoverished. Attackers are not only in the ‘driver’s seat’ when it comes to initiating and intensifying conflict, they also suffer the least from costly opportunities for peace and wasteful conflict.

Conclusions and Discussion. The intention to increase wealth is among the key reasons for conflict – individuals, groups and nation states initiate and escalate predatory attacks on others to appropriate resources, to increase access to precious materials and territories controlled by others, or to benefit otherwise from what neighbors hold and produce. Even the mere anticipation of such predatory attacks can lead individuals, groups, and nation states to introduce a range of preventive measures, from legally-binding contracts to investing in military defense and pre-emptive strikes (Abbink ▇▇▇▇▇▇ & de Haan, 2014; ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 1978). The inevitable arms-race set in motion by predatory attacks can be excessively costly, reducing (rather than increasing) economic wealth and prosperity in both conflict initiators and responders (▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ et al., 2022). Already in the simple attacker-defender contest studied here, attackers on average lost 20.87% of their original wealth, and defenders 62.63%. Whereas both sides started out equally wealthy, attackers on average earned 111.73% more post-conflict than their defending counterparts. Next to using predatory attacks on others, individuals gain wealth through economic production, including technological innovation and investing in human capital. Individuals, groups, and nation states oftentimes face a tradeoff between investing in ‘peaceful’ economic production and ‘aggressive’ predation on what others have and produce. We modeled such tradeoffs under various cost levels and found that having rather than not having ‘peaceful’ production opportunities can indeed reduce overall conflict, and investment in predatory attacks in particular. We also found that when economic production becomes a more costly way to create wealth, predatory attacks become more rather than less likely. Our results therefore suggest that preventing renewed aggression would not only require opportunities for economic production but also opportunities that are comparatively easy to implement and realize. Indeed, both our model and our experiments revealed that while introducing costly production opportunities reduces the intensity of conflict, it does not eliminate predatory attacks. With the threat of predatory attacks looming, individuals continue to invest in defense and cannot fully focus on ‘peaceful’ creation of wealth through economic production (also see ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 1999). When peace is costly, wasteful conflicts emerge and persist, diminishing wealth and intensifying inequalities. Using recent advances in theory on conflict in general and on asymmetric attacker-defender contests in particular, our findings integrate disparate literatures on the ‘guns versus butter’ tradeoffs that agents make (▇▇▇▇▇▇ & ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ 2001; ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 1998; ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2014) and on when and how natural resources and economic wealth can be a curse rather than blessing (▇▇▇ ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, 2011; ▇▇▇▇▇ et al., 2014). Combined, this allows us to conclude, first, that individuals invest in predatory attacks and, consequently, invest even more in defensive protection. Second, our theoretical results suggest that when economic production is a comparatively ‘cheap’ technology for wealth creation, predatory attack loses its appeal and wasteful conflict is reduced. Yet when economic production is comparatively costly, predatory attack gains in appeal and wasteful conflict re-emerges. Third, when peace is costly and conflict increasingly likely, especially those under attack become impoverished. Attackers are not only in the ‘driver’s seat’ when it comes to initiating and intensifying conflict, they also suffer the least from costly opportunities for peace and wasteful conflict.