Common use of Current Situation Clause in Contracts

Current Situation. In July 2020, renewed skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia broke out. An exchange of drone and artillery strikes in the Tavush (Armenia) and Qazakh (Azerbaijan) regions resulted in the deaths of at least 17 military personnel, including an Azerbaijani major-general. This prompted opposition-led protests in Baku, which called for war. Through July and August, the Azerbaijani armed forces conducted military exercises with Turkish support. This appears to have foreshadowed a major offensive by Azerbaijan, which was launched on 27 September. Supported by Turkish drones, military advisors and, allegedly, j ihadist m ercenaries from Syria, the Azerbaijani armed forces succeeded in capturing Armenian-controlled territory to the south of Nagorno-Karabakh along the Iranian border, as well as the city of Shusha, which overlooks Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert. Baku and Ankara appear to have taken advantage of the distracted global environment, as well as the need to act before harsh winter weather set in. Over the course of the fighting, both sides also targeted infrastructure outside of Nagorno- Karabakh in artillery and rocket attacks. For example, Azerbaijani units destroyed a b ridge linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, while the Armenian military s helled Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, Ganja, on four occasions, narrowly missing oil pipeline infrastructure. As of 22 October, according to e stimates cited by Russian President ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, almost 5,000 people had been killed during the renewed hostilities, most of them in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The toll has likely risen considerably since then. Ultimately, the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces were overwhelmed by the military superiority of the Azerbaijanis and Turks, losing a pproximately 100 tanks, 50 armoured combat vehicles and 130 artillery pieces – or some 3 5% of its inventory. On 9 November, Armenian Prime Minister ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Azerbaijani President ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ signed an agreement brokered by Russian President ▇▇▇▇▇, which established a full ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. As part of the ceasefire agreement, the warring parties will retain control over the territories that they currently possess. However, by 1 December, Armenia is obliged to return to Azerbaijan the districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh that it has controlled since 1994, as well as two small Azeri exclaves in the north-eastern region of Tavush. Armenia will retain control of the Lachin corridor, the single highway that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, which, along with the border, will be overseen by a contingent of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers. Armenia will also permit Azerbaijan direct road access through the southern Syunik region to its autonomous exclave of Nakhchivan, oversight of which will be provided by Russia’s Federal Security Service.

Current Situation. In July 2020, renewed skirmishes between Azerbaijan and Armenia broke out. An exchange of drone and artillery strikes in the Tavush (Armenia) and Qazakh (Azerbaijan) regions resulted in the deaths of at least 17 military personnel, including an Azerbaijani major-general. This prompted opposition-led protests in Baku, which called for war. Through July and August, the Azerbaijani armed forces conducted military exercises with Turkish support. This appears to have foreshadowed a major offensive by Azerbaijan, which was launched on 27 September. Supported by Turkish drones, military advisors and, allegedly, j ihadist m ercenaries jihadist mercenaries from Syria, the Azerbaijani armed forces succeeded in capturing Armenian-controlled territory to the south of Nagorno-Karabakh along the Iranian border, as well as the city of Shusha, which overlooks Nagorno-Karabakh’s capital, Stepanakert. Baku and Ankara appear to have taken advantage of the distracted global environment, as well as the need to act before harsh winter weather set in. Over the course of the fighting, both sides also targeted infrastructure outside of Nagorno- Karabakh in artillery and rocket attacks. For example, Azerbaijani units destroyed a b ridge bridge linking Armenia with Nagorno-Karabakh, while the Armenian military s helled shelled Azerbaijan’s second-largest city, Ganja, on four occasions, narrowly missing oil pipeline infrastructure. As of 22 October, according to e stimates estimates cited by Russian President ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, almost 5,000 people had been killed during the renewed hostilities, most of them in and around Nagorno-Karabakh. The toll has likely risen considerably since then. Ultimately, the Armenian and Nagorno-Karabakh armed forces were overwhelmed by the military superiority of the Azerbaijanis and Turks, losing a pproximately approximately 100 tanks, 50 armoured combat vehicles and 130 artillery pieces – or some 3 535% of its inventory. On 9 November, Armenian Prime Minister ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Azerbaijani President ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ signed an agreement brokered by Russian President ▇▇▇▇▇, which established a full ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh. As part of the ceasefire agreement, the warring parties will retain control over the territories that they currently possess. However, by 1 December, Armenia is obliged to return to Azerbaijan the districts outside of Nagorno-Karabakh that it has controlled since 1994, as well as two small Azeri exclaves in the north-eastern region of Tavush. Armenia will retain control of the Lachin corridor, the single highway that connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia, which, along with the border, will be overseen by a contingent of 2,000 Russian peacekeepers. Armenia will also permit Azerbaijan direct road access through the southern Syunik region to its autonomous exclave of Nakhchivan, oversight of which will be provided by Russia’s Federal Security Service.