Formal Security Analysis. In this analysis, we conduct a formal security analysis to show that the proposed scheme is secure. First, we describe the scheme in algorithmic language. As described in the algorithm, the sensor initiates the authentication scheme. It generates a random nonce N, computes an h(MSIdi, ▇▇▇, N), and sends to the remote user R a message composed of [MSIdi, N, h(MSIdi, Idi, N)]. The remote user receives the message. It verifies the integrity of the message by computing the hash of the message. Then, it compares with the received hash. If the check is successful, it generates a random nonce M, else it sends an authentication failure message F1 to the sensor node SN. The remote user checks the sensor location. If the sensor node SN is not in the same covered area as the remote user, then it computes a h(Idi, N, M), and sends to the gateway node G a message composed of [MSIdi, N, M, h(▇▇▇, N, M)]. Upon receiving the message by the gateway node, it verifies the integrity of the message by computing the hash of the message. Then, it compares with the received hash. If the check is successful, the gateway node generates a random nonce S, computes T = N S, computes h(▇▇▇, M, S), and sends to the remote user a message composed of [N, M, T, h(▇▇▇, M, S)]. In the case of a unsuccessful check, the gateway node sends an authentication failure message F2 to the remote user.
Appears in 2 contracts
Sources: Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme, Authentication and Key Agreement Scheme