Common use of General Framework Clause in Contracts

General Framework. 2.1.1 A price competition (2.1) ´i m`1 hi 0 if 3j such asphi > phj , where —i represents all firms other than i, m c n the number of firms offering the same price as i. Thus, the i firm profit is Πi(phi, ph´i ) = (phi — ci)Di(phi, ph´i ), (2.2) where ci = ce (respectively ci = cs) if i uses electrolysis (respectively steam reforming) technology. Each firm sets its price under the assumption that its competitors will maintain their price regardless of what it chooses (Cournot conjecture). Decisions are made simultaneously. The ▇▇▇▇ equilibrium is the n-tuple (ph‹1 , . . . , p‹hi, . . . , p‹hn ) such as for all i, ph‹i = arg maxphi = Πi(phi, p‹h´i ). With a reductio ad absurdum, we can demonstrate the only ▇▇▇▇ equilibrium is p‹hi = ci.

General Framework. 2.1.1 A price competition (2.1) ´i m`1 hi ’ 0 if 3j Dj such asphi > ą phj , where —´i represents all firms other than i, m c ă n the number of firms offering the same price as i. Thus, the i firm profit is Πi(phiΠipphi, ph´i ) = (phi — ci)Di(phiq “ pphi ´ ciqDipphi, ph´i )q, (2.2) where ci = “ ce (respectively ci = “ cs) if i uses electrolysis (respectively steam reforming) technology. Each firm sets its price under the assumption that its competitors will maintain their price regardless of what it chooses (Cournot conjecture). Decisions are made simultaneously. The ▇▇▇▇ equilibrium is the n-tuple (ph‹1 pph‹1 , . . . , p‹hi, . . . , p‹hn ) q such as for all i, ph‹i = “ arg maxphi = Πi(phi“ Πipphi, p‹h´i ). q. With a reductio ad absurdum, we can demonstrate the only ▇▇▇▇ equilibrium is p‹hi = “ ci.