Known Specific Temporary Information Attack. If an adversary obtains secret parameters and , he cannot get session key = ℎ( ∥ ∥ ∥ 2) because hidden value is = ℎ( ∥ ∥ ) = ℎ( ∥ ∥ ) wherein and are stored in each device and is inaccessible. Therefore, our protocol is secure against temporary secret leakage attack.
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Sources: Research Article
Known Specific Temporary Information Attack. If an adversary 𝒜 obtains secret parameters 𝑥 and 𝑦, he cannot get session key 𝑆𝐾𝑖𝑗 = ℎ( ℎ(𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 ∥ 𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑗 ∥ 𝐾 ∥ 2𝑡2) because hidden value 𝐾 is 𝐾 = ℎ( ℎ(𝛼𝑖 ∥ 𝑑𝑖 𝜏𝑗 ∥ 𝑀𝑖𝑄𝑗) = ℎ( ℎ(𝑑𝑗𝜏𝑖 ∥ 𝛽𝑗 ∥ ▇▇ ▇▇) wherein 𝑀𝑖 and ▇▇ are stored in each device and is inaccessible. Therefore, our protocol is secure against temporary secret leakage attack.
Appears in 1 contract
Sources: Research Article