Settlement of Disputes between Contracting Parties 1. Should any dispute arise concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement the Contracting Parties shall try to settle the dispute amicably.
2. If the dispute cannot be settled in a such manner it shall, upon the request of either Contracting Party, be submitted to an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
3. The Arbitral Tribunal shall be constituted in the following way: within two months of the receipt of the request for arbitration, each Contracting Party shall appoint one arbitrator. The two arbitrators will choose a national of a third State who, on the approval by the two Contracting Parties, shall act as chairman of the Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as "the Chairman"). The Chairman shall be appointed within two months from the date of appointment of the other two arbitrators.
4. If within the period specified in paragraph 3 of this Article either Contracting Party shall not have appointed its arbitrator or the two arbitrators shall not have agreed on the chairman, a request may be made to the President of the International Court of Justice to make the appointment. If he is a national of either Contracting Party or if he is otherwise prevented from discharging the said function, the Vice-President shall be invited to make the appointment. If the Vice-President also is a national of either Contracting Party or is prevented from discharging the said function, the member of the International Court of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Contracting Party shall be invited to make the appointment.
5. The Arbitral Tribunal shall reach its decision by a majority of votes, such decision shall be final and binding. Each contracting Party shall bear the costs of its own arbitrator and its counsel in the arbitral proceedings, the costs of the chairman and the remaining costs shall be borne in equal parts by both Contracting Parties. The Tribunal may, however, in its decision direct that a higher proportion of costs shall be borne by one of the two Contracting Parties. The Arbitral Tribunal shall determine its own procedure.
Settlement of Disputes between the Contracting Parties 1. Disputes between the Contracting Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Agreement should, if possible, be settled through diplomatic channels.
2. If a dispute between the contracting Parties cannot thus be settled, it shall upon the request of either Contracting Party be submitted to an arbitral tribunal.
3. Such as arbitral tribunal shall be constituted for each individual case in the following way. Within two months of the receipt of the request for arbitration, each Contracting Party shall appoint one member of the tribunal. Those two members shall then select a national of a third State who an approval by the two Contracting Parties shall be appointed Chairman of the tribunal. The Chairman shall be appointed within two months from the date of appointment of the other two members.
4. If within the periods specified in paragraph 3 of this Article the necessary appointments have not been made either Contracting Party may, in the absence of any other agreement, invite the President of the International Court of Justice to make any necessary appointments. If the President is a national of either Contracting Party or if he is otherwise prevented from discharging the said function, the Vice-President shall be invited to make the necessary appointments. If the vice- President is a national of either Contracting Party or if he too is prevented form discharging the said function, the members of the International Court of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Contracting Party Shall be invited to make the necessary appointments.
5. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its decision by a majority of votes. Such decision shall be binding on both Contracting Parties. Each Contracting Party shall bear the cost of its own member of the tribunal and of its representation in the arbitral proceedings; the cost of the Chairman and the remaining cost shall be borne in equal parts by the Contracting Parties. The tribunal may, however, in its decision direct that a higher proportion of costs shall be borne by one of the two Contracting Parties, and this award shall be binding on both Contracting Parties. The tribunal shall determine its won procedure.
Settlement of disputes between the parties
1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Chapter shall, as far as possible, be settled with consultation through diplomatic channel.
2. If a dispute cannot thus be settled within 6 months, it shall, upon the request of either Party, be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. 3. Such tribunal comprises of 3 arbitrators. Within 2 months of the receipt of the written notice requesting arbitration, each Party shall appoint one arbitrator. Those 2 arbitrators shall, within further 2 months, together select a national of a third State having diplomatic relations with both Parties who, upon approval by the Parties, shall be appointed as Chairman of the arbitral tribunal.
4. If the arbitral tribunal has not been constituted within 4 months from the receipt of the written notice requesting arbitration, either Party may, in the absence of any other agreement, invite the President of the International Court of Justice to make any necessary appointments. If the President is a national of either Party or is otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions, the Member of the International Court of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Party or is not otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions shall be invited to make such necessary appointments.
5. The arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its award in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the principles of international law recognized by both Parties.
6. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its award by a majority of votes. Such award shall be final and binding upon both Parties. The arbitral tribunal shall, upon the request of either Party, explain the reasons of its award.
7. Each Party shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and of its representation in arbitral proceedings. The relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal shall be borne in equal parts by the Parties.
1. Any dispute between an investor of one Party and the other Party in connection with an investment in the territory of the other Party shall, as far as possible, be settled amicably through negotiations between the parties to the dispute.
2. If the dispute cannot be settled through negotiations within 6 months from the date on which the disputing investor requested for the consultation or negotiation in writing, and if the disputing investor has not submitted the dispute for resolution to the competent court (16) or any other binding dispute settlement mechanism (17) of the Party receiving the investment, it may be submitted to one of the following international conciliation or arbitration fora by the choice of the investor (18): (a) conciliation or arbitration in accordance with the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), under the Convention on the Settlement of Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, done at Washington on March 18th, 1965; (b) conciliation or arbitration under the Additional Facility Rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes so long as the ICSID Convention is not in force between the Parties; (c) arbitration under the arbitration Rules of the United Nations Comission on International Trade Law; and (d) if agreed with the disputing Party, any arbitration in accordance with other arbitration rules. For more clarity, the election of one dispute settlement fora shall be definitive and exclusive.
3. An arbitral tribunal established under paragraph 2 shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Agreement and applicable rules of international law. 4. The disputing investor who intends to submit the dispute to conciliation or arbitration pursuant to paragraph 2 shall give to the disputing Party written notice of its intent to do so at least 90 days before the claim is submitted. The notice of intent shall specify: (a) the name and address of the disputing investor; (b) the specific measures of the disputing Party at issue and a brief summary of the factual and legal basis of the investment dispute sufficient to present the problem clearly, including the obligations under this Chapter alleged to have been breached; (c) the waiver of the disputing investor from the right to initiate any proceedings before any of the other dispute settlement for referred to in paragraph 2 in relation to the matter under dispute; (d) conciliation or arbitration set forth in paragraph 2 which the disputing investor will choose; and (e) the relief sought and the approximate amount of expropriation claimed. 5. Notwithstanding paragraph 4, no claim may be submitted to conciliation or arbitration set forth in paragraph 2, if more than 3 years have elapsed since the date on which the disputing investor became aware, or should reasonably have become aware, of a breach of an obligation under this Chapter causing loss or damage to the disputing investor or its investment referred to in paragraph 1. 6. The arbitration award shall be final and binding upon both parties to the dispute. Both Parties shall commit themselves to the enforcement of the award.
Concluding Remarks This chapter explored whether multiple concepts related to slot coordination offer scope for finding solutions for the specific issues experienced at super-congested airports relating to this dissertation’s research questions, primarily in the field of reflecting the public value associated with slots in coordination decisions and safeguarding airport access for the purposes of a competitive air transport market safeguarded by EU Regulation 1008/2008. The concepts discussed include the debate on who holds the legal title to a slot, the functionally and financially independent coordinator, the application of the new entrant rule, the implementation of a secondary market for slots and the relationship between the allocation of slots and competition law. In my view, slots are allocated to airlines as entitlements to use available infrastructure, subject to conditions such as utilization thresholds or allocation criteria. Indeed, they represent relevant operational, economic, legal and social interests and functions.1342 Inter alia, according to the Commission, slots are “critical inputs” for any entrant wishing to operate or expand services.1343 Although airlines, airports and governments alike have claimed they should be regarded as the legal owners of slots,1344 they cannot, in my view, be identified as property rights. At super-congested airports in particular, slots are valuable concepts to society at large as they safeguard public functions such as connectivity and airport access, as discussed in Chapter 2, sections 2.3 and 2.4. Accordingly, Chapter 6 recommends that the coordinator should ensure that scarce slots are declared, allocated and used in a way that is reflective of these public functions. Solving the debate on slot ownership by clarifying that slots are essentially public goods could contribute to making this recommendation work. Furthermore, a future slot regime should be cognizant of the shifted role of the coordinator from performing merely technical functions to that of a policymaker, so to say. At super-congested airports, slot allocation ultimately comes down to making decisions which airlines can and cannot operate to and from an airport.1345 With slot scarcity levels and the risk of judicial reviews of allocation decisions rising, coordinators play an increasingly important role in the correct application of the slot allocation rules. After all, airlines are all in the same ‘game’ for the last available slot pair and the coordinator continuously has to make trade-offs between competing slot requests. Though the coordinator has been delegated public functions, by no means was the slot coordinator intended to perform the task of policy making. Arguably, the coordinator has been handed a role it was never intended to perform.1346 In a constrained environment where the overall number of slots is largely fixed and there is no outlook for capacity increases, the possibilities for airlines to start or expand services requires incumbent airlines to exit or downscale their services at a particular airport.1347 Given the high value of slots at super-congested airports, it is unlikely that airlines will simply hand back the slots they hold to the coordinator, even in times of economic downturn. Instead, they may capitalize the slots they hold to pay off creditors in case of a bankruptcy or insolvency, or they may engage in slot transfers or lease agreements, as discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.6 above. Hence, airport access becomes foreclosed in its entirety to airlines wanting to expand or 1342 See European Commission, supra note 54, paragraph 11. 1343 See Case M.3770 – Lufthansa/Swiss, supra note 274, paragraph 27. 1344 See Abeyratne, supra note 55, at 36; ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, supra note 63, at 2-2. 1345 See ICAO, supra note 256. 1346 See ▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al., supra note 18, at 9. 1347 See ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇(II), supra note 113, at 111. start operations at super-congested airports with no slots freely available, or at peak times at other congested airports.
Settlement of Disputes between the Parties 1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Chapter shall, as far as possible, be settled with consultation through diplomatic channel.
2. If a dispute cannot thus be settled within 6 months, it shall, upon the request of either Party, be submitted to an ad hoc arbitral tribunal. 3. Such tribunal comprises of 3 arbitrators. Within 2 months of the receipt of the written notice requesting arbitration, each Party shall appoint one arbitrator. Those 2 arbitrators shall, within further 2 months, together select a national of a third State having diplomatic relations with both Parties who, upon approval by the Parties, shall be appointed as Chairman of the arbitral tribunal.
4. If the arbitral tribunal has not been constituted within 4 months from the receipt of the written notice requesting arbitration, either Party may, in the absence of any other agreement, invite the President of the International Court of Justice to make any necessary appointments. If the President is a national of either Party or is otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions, the Member of the International Court of Justice next in seniority who is not a national of either Party or is not otherwise prevented from discharging the said functions shall be invited to make such necessary appointments.
5. The arbitral tribunal shall determine its own procedure. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its award in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement and the principles of international law recognized by both Parties.
6. The arbitral tribunal shall reach its award by a majority of votes. Such award shall be final and binding upon both Parties. The arbitral tribunal shall, upon the request of either Party, explain the reasons of its award.
7. Each Party shall bear the costs of its appointed arbitrator and of its representation in arbitral proceedings. The relevant costs of the Chairman and tribunal shall be borne in equal parts by the Parties.