Other Issues and Ideas. A. Throughout the interviews it was questioned why the initiative is referred to as a “CSIRT” since that structure tends to be “within” organisations. It was recognised that EU Support for national CSIRTs was aimed at governmental bodies coordinating a range of ministries/ departments/ agencies: appropriate since the country government was in common. It was strongly suggested that a suitable name is required for the 4SECURail model and platform to indicate that it is a collaborative information sharing initiative between European rail cyber security actors. This guidance is accepted, and a name is offered later in this document (see model). B. The ISAC works at a strategic level and is a membership organisation. 4SECURail operational collaboration model should acknowledge the ISAC as complementary. C. The supply chain will analyse indicators of compromise (IOC) after events. D. Organisational contact points can “trigger” activities at operational level (via the collaborative platform) which later shares with ISAC (what has happened). E. If future rail CSIRTs worked the same way, then that would be advantageous, and can be supported by ENISA / ▇▇-▇▇▇▇.
Appears in 1 contract
Sources: Grant Agreement
Other Issues and Ideas. A. Throughout the interviews it was questioned why the initiative is referred to as a “CSIRT” since that structure tends to be “within” organisations. It was recognised that EU Support for national CSIRTs was aimed at governmental bodies coordinating a range of ministries/ departments/ agencies: appropriate since the country government was in common. It was strongly suggested that a suitable name is required for the 4SECURail model and platform to indicate that it is a collaborative information sharing initiative between European rail cyber security actors. This guidance is accepted, and a name is offered later in this document (see model).
B. . • The ISAC ▇▇-▇▇▇▇ works at a strategic level and is a membership organisation. 4SECURail operational collaboration model should acknowledge the ISAC ▇▇-▇▇▇▇ as complementary.
C. . • The supply chain will analyse indicators of compromise (IOCIoC) after events.
D. . • Organisational contact points can “trigger” activities at operational level (via the collaborative platform) which later shares with ISAC ▇▇-▇▇▇▇ (what has happened).
E. . • If future rail CSIRTs worked the same way, then that would be advantageous, and can be supported by ENISA / ▇▇-▇▇▇▇.
Appears in 1 contract
Sources: Deliverable D3.2