Public Key Cryptography Sample Clauses

Public Key Cryptography. ‌ In modern cryptography, there’s a difference between symmetric and asymmetric cryp- tosystems. In symmetric cryptography, there is only one secret key used between the sender and the receiver. Thus, the same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Symmetric primitives include block ciphers, stream ciphers, cryptographic hash func- tions, and message authentication codes (MACs). Common to all symmetric cryptosys- tems is that the parties who wish to communicate need some prior secret established before distributing keys. This is usually achieved by establishing a secure channel to a trusted authority (TA) who then issues a common secret key to both parties. In comparison to symmetric-key cryptosystems, the main idea of asymmetric or public key cryptosystems is to make key distribution easier. It is asymmetric in the sense that each party has a key pair, a public key and a private key. Respectively, these are used for encryption and decryption. Although the keys have some cryptographic relation, the public key can be widely distributed without compromising the private key. Thus, any party who wish to communicate with another party can encrypt the message using the recipient’s public key who then can decrypt it using his or her private key. It is also possible to sign data, in which the private key is used for signing and the public key is used for verification. Unlike symmetric-key cryptography, there is no need for having established a secret prior to interaction.
Public Key Cryptography. The public key cryptography (PKC) is introduced by ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ [5]. PKC involves two different keys for encryption and decryption instead of sin- gle key as symmetric key system. Since, public key is random string in PKC. Therefore, To prove the relation between entity and its public key, PKC adopts certificate mechanism where certificate-based protocols work by considering that each entity has a public and private key pair. These public keys are authenti- cated via certificate authority (CA) which issue a certificate. When two entities wish to establish a session key, a pair of ephemeral (short term) public keys are exchanged between them. The ephemeral and static keys are then combined in a way so as to obtain the agreed session key. The authenticity of the static keys provided by signature of CA assures that only the entities who posses the static keys are able to compute the session key.

Related to Public Key Cryptography

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  • Bibliography [ABD16] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. A subfield lattice attack on overstretched NTRU assumptions. In: Springer, 2016, pages 153–178. [AD21] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. Lattice Attacks on NTRU and LWE: A History of Refinements. In: Compu- tational Cryptography: Algorithmic Aspects of Cryptol- ogy. London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series. Cambridge University Press, 2021, pages 15–40. [ADPS16] ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and Pe- ter ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Post-quantum Key Exchange–A New Hope. In: 2016, pages 327–343. [AEN19] ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇. Random Lattices: Theory And Practice. Available at ▇▇▇▇▇://▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇/bin/random_lattice. pdf. 2019. [AFG13] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. On the efficacy of solving LWE by reduction to unique-SVP. In: Springer, 2013, pages 293–310. [AGPS20] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Estimating quan- tum speedups for lattice sieves. In: Springer, 2020, pages 583–613. [AGVW17] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Revisiting the expected cost of solving uSVP and applications to LWE. In: International Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer. 2017, pages 297–322. [Ajt99] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. Generating Hard Instances of the Short Basis Problem. In: ICALP. 1999, pages 1–9. [AKS01] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. A sieve algorithm for the shortest lattice vector problem. In: STOC. 2001, pages 601–610. [AL22] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇. Predicting BKZ Z- Shapes on q-ary Lattices. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Re- port 2022/843. 2022. [Alb+15] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇. On the complex- ity of the BKW algorithm on LWE. In: Designs, Codes and Cryptography 74.2 (2015), pages 325–354. [Alb+19] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. The general sieve kernel and new records in lattice reduction. In: Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Tech- niques. Springer. 2019, pages 717–746. [ALL19] ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Decoding Challenge. Available at http : / / ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇. 2019. [AN17] ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇. Random ▇▇▇- ▇▇▇▇▇ revisited: lattice enumeration with discrete prun- ing. In: Eurocrypt. 2017, pages 65–102. [ANS18] ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇. Quantum lattice enumeration and tweaking discrete pruning. In: Asiacrypt. 2018, pages 405–434. [AP11] ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Generating Shorter Bases for Hard Random Lattices. In: Theory of Computing Sys- tems 48.3 (Apr. 2011). Preliminary version in STACS 2009, pages 535–553. [AR05] ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. Lattice problems in NP coNP. In: J. ACM 52.5 (2005). Preliminary version in FOCS 2004, pages 749–765. [AUV19] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. Faster sieving algorithm for approximate SVP with con- stant approximation factors. Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2019/1028. 2019. [AWHT16] ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇. Improved progressive BKZ algorithms and their precise cost estimation by sharp simulator. In: Springer, 2016, pages 789–819. [Bab16] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. Graph isomorphism in quasipolynomial time. In: Proceedings of the forty-eighth annual ACM symposium on Theory of Computing. 2016, pages 684– 697. [Bab19] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. Canonical form for graphs in quasipolyno- mial time: preliminary report. In: Proceedings of the 51st Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Com- puting. 2019, pages 1237–1246. [Bab86] ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇. On ▇▇▇▇▇▇’ lattice reduction and the near- est lattice point problem. In: Combinatorica 6.1 (1986). Preliminary version in STACS 1985, pages 1–13.

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