Replay Attack Clause Samples

Replay Attack. During the communication between the B-GKAP entities, an attacker might sniff mes- sages in the network and re-transmit sniffed messages for malicious reasons such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. To protect against replay attacks, timestamp variable (T ) is added into the protocol messages. Hence, the receiver entity can check T value against replay attack attempts.

Replay Attack. To resist the replay attack, our protocol uses short-term keys. The lifetime of the short-term keys (kAi and kBi , i 1, 2, .

Replay Attack. The protocol uses timestamps 1 and 2, random-temporary nonces and , that are used as hashed values = ℎ( ∥ ∥ ∥ 1). Any changes in them violates message integrity and the condition =? ′ = ℎ(′ ∥ ∥ ∥ 1) will no longer hold. Hence it is secure against replay attack because all the messages are sent in a valid ∆ time period.

Replay Attack. We assume that the intruder 𝒜, with the aim of intercepting communication between 𝒟ℛ𝒩𝑢 and 𝒟ℛ𝒩𝑣 , attempts to capture and then replay the message, 𝚿1: 𝚿1 = ( NON𝑒𝑢, Ω𝑢, 𝚲𝑢, 𝒷𝑢, 𝒳𝑢, 𝒞𝓇𝑢) To proceed ahead, 𝒜 will be required to compute the value of NON𝑒𝑢 = 𝛦 𝒷𝑣( N𝑢). However, to do so, the value 𝒶𝑣 needs to be extracted from the relation 𝒷𝑣 = 𝒶𝑣. 𝐷. The same process needs to be repeated in case replay is demanded for 𝛹2 and 𝛹3. Here, again, performing such computational effort is 𝒜. Therefore, the proposed scheme guarantees protection from the Replay Attack.

Replay Attack. In this type of attack, the attacker first listen to communication between the client and the server and then tries to imitate user to login on to the server by resending the captured messages transmitted between the client and the server. Replaying a login request message (IDi*, C2, T) of one session into another session is useless because the client’s smart card uses current time stamp value T in each new session, which makes all the messages dynamic and valid for small interval of time. Old messages can not be replayed successfully in any other session and hence the proposed protocol is secure against message replay attack.

Replay Attack. The protocol uses timestamps 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, random-temporary nonces 𝑥 and 𝑦, that are used as hashed values 𝑍𝑖 = ℎ(𝑇𝐼𝐷𝑖 ∥ 𝜏𝑖 ∥ 𝑀𝑖𝑄𝑗 ∥ 𝑡1). Any changes in them violates message integrity and the condition 𝑍𝑖 =? 𝑍′ = ℎ(𝑇𝐼𝐷′ ∥ 𝜏𝑖 ∥ 𝑀𝑗𝑄𝑖 ∥ 𝑡1) will no longer hold. Hence it is secure against replay attack 𝑖 𝑖 because all the messages are sent in a valid ∆𝑇 time period.

Replay Attack. An adversary cannot start a replay attack against our scheme because of the freshness of ri in each session. If Tri (x) has appeared before or the status shows in process, the participant Ui+1 rejects the session request. If the adversary wants to launch the replay attack successfully, it must compute and modify Tri (x) and Ci cor- rectly which is impossible.

Replay Attack. If the intruder can impersonate the source node or the destination node by replaying information what he or she collected as the source node and the destination node established a pairwise key, we say that the protocol used for security can not prevent the replay attack [10]. In TLPKA, the source node and the destination node record the random number di and nonce ci for a period of time. Even if the intruder can collect messages gdi , Ekij{▇ ▇} , Ekij{ci,▇ ▇' + 1} , and Ekij{ci' + 1} , he or she can not impersonate the source node or the destination node and try to establish a pairwise key with a normal source node or destination node. If the intruder tries to impersonate the destination node, the normal source node will check to see whether it can receive the correct challenge ci+1 and different ci in Step 11 of the Source Node part. The message of Step 11 changes each time. Only the source node can decrypt the correct challenge ci′+1 and check its validity. Consequently, the old message can not be used for a replay attack.

Replay Attack. Definition