Research Question. On one level, the research question can be described as; ‘what factors have affected British government engagement with the public on nuclear deterrence policy?’ It is, however, the central argument of this thesis that government involvement in public discourse about nuclear deterrence policy has been inhibited. The thesis will therefore consider the salient factors considered by British governments when formulating nuclear deterrence policy and identify what causes this apparent inhibition. In short, the thesis will consider; ‘why have successive British governments struggled to sustain a public discourse on nuclear weapons policy and strategy?’ The author’s underlying hypothesis is that there is a connection between the Second World War debate about the legitimacy of the strategic bombing campaign and subsequent government reluctance to engage in public discussion about nuclear deterrence policy. The common element here appears to be a political aversion to being seen to be basing strategy on a willingness to inflict significant non-combatant casualties. The core of the issue is not necessarily the willingness to inflict non-combatant casualties per se, but the aversion to public admission of that as a policy objective. As is demonstrated in Chapter 4 below, this is evident in the highly nuanced correspondence on the purpose and conduct of the strategic bombing campaign between Whitehall and Bomber Command between 1943 and 1945. Early research for this thesis suggested that this moral ambivalence could be 7 UK GOVT 2006. The future of the UK's strategic nuclear deterrent: the White Paper CM6994. London: HMSO.
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