Security Result Sample Clauses

The Security Result clause defines the outcome or consequences related to the enforcement or realization of a security interest in an agreement. Typically, this clause outlines what happens when a party exercises its rights over collateral, such as the transfer of ownership, application of proceeds from a sale, or satisfaction of outstanding obligations. For example, if a borrower defaults, the lender may seize and sell the secured asset, applying the proceeds to the debt. The core function of this clause is to clarify the process and effects of enforcing security interests, thereby reducing uncertainty and allocating risk between the parties.
Security Result. The protocol presented in the earlier section is provably secure against passive adversaries in the model of [4], from where the notations and definitions are taken. A Theorem 1: Let P be the protocol as defined above. Let be a passive adversary making qex = (qika +qjoin +qdelete) Execute queries to the parties and running in time t. Then Protocol P is a secure GKA protocol. Namely: AdvPA(t, qex) ≤ 2qex ∗ SuccDDH (tj) (Ml) chooses a new random secret, rl, and sends all the blinded secrets to the new group leader , Mlr . The new where tj ≤ t + qex |P|t |P| , texp is the time to perform an 3For each session, one may want to elect a new leader. exponentiation in G and being the maximum number of participants in the protocol. { } A ∆ which gains an advantage in solving an instance of the Decisional Diffie-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (DDH) Problem. The Send and Corrupt queries are not applicable as we are dealing with a passive adversary and there are no long-term secrets. Thus the only relevant queries are the Execute, Reveal and Test queries. Assume the adversary distinguishes the session key with a probability non-negligibly greater than 0.5. We construct from a DDH attacker ∆ that receives as in- put an instance D = g, g1, g2, g3 and predicts if it is an instance from (g, gra , grb , grarb ) or (g, gra , grb , grc ) with a non-negligible advantage. A A The Attacker ∆ feeds with elements derived from the instance D in the reply to the Execute query of the session for which will make the Test query. So ∆ picks at random ctest from [1, qex] which is its guess for the number of the Execute query, corresponding to the session, for which makes the Test query. For all other sessions, ∆ responds to Execute queries with randomly generated data. A A ∆ replies to the Test query with a session key, sk, con- structed using data from the instance D. sk is a valid ses- sion key only if the instance D is a DH tuple. Thus, if the adversary correctly identifies sk as the session key, the tuple (g, g1, g2, g3) is indeed a DH tuple otherwise it is a random tuple. The success probability of ∆ is the probabil- ity that it correctly guesses the session for which makes the Test query (1/qex), multiplied by the success probabil- ity of A. Thus if we denote by p the probability of adversary ∆ is: SuccDDH (tj) ≥ p/q .ex Aof distinguishing the session key, the probability of success A |P| The running time of ∆ is bounded by the running time of and the time to perform at most exponentiations during qex querie...
View SourceView Similar (4)
Security Result. The protocol presented in the earlier section is provably secure against passive adversaries in the model of [4], from where the notations and definitions are taken. A Theorem 1: Let P be the protocol as defined above. Let be a passive adversary making qex = (qika +qjoin +qdelete) Execute queries to the parties and running in time t. Then Protocol P is a secure GKA protocol. Namely: AdvPA(t, qex) ≤ 2qex ∗ SuccDDH(t′) (Ml) chooses a new random secret, rl, and sends all the blinded secrets to the new group leader , ▇▇' . The new where t′ ≤ t + qex |P|t |P| exp , texp is the time to perform an 3For each session, one may want to elect a new leader. exponentiation in G and being the maximum number of participants in the protocol.
View SourceView Similar (3)
Security Result. P The security of our protocol is measured as the probability that an adversary can get some (partial) information on the key. This probability is denoted Advake and depends on the number of messages sent on the network.
View Source

Related to Security Result

  • Information Regarding Collateral (a) Level 3 and the Borrower will furnish to the Collateral Agent prompt written notice of any change (i) in any Loan Party’s corporate name or in any trade name used to identify it in the conduct of its business or in the ownership of its properties, (ii) in any Loan Party’s identity or corporate structure or (iii) in any Loan Party’s Federal Taxpayer Identification Number. Each of Level 3 and the Borrower agrees not to effect or permit any change referred to in the preceding sentence unless all filings (or arrangements therefor satisfactory to the Collateral Agent) have been made under the Uniform Commercial Code or otherwise that are required in order for the Collateral Agent to continue at all times following such change to have a valid, legal and perfected security interest in all the Collateral. Each of Level 3 and the Borrower also agrees promptly to notify the Collateral Agent if any material portion of the Collateral is damaged or destroyed. (b) Each year, at the time of delivery of the certificate pursuant to paragraph (c) of Section 5.01, Level 3 shall deliver to the Collateral Agent certificates of an authorized officer of Level 3 (i) setting forth the information required pursuant to (A) the Annual Perfection Certificate and (B) until such time as the Collateral Permit Condition is satisfied with respect to Level 3 LLC, the Annual Loan Proceeds Note Perfection Certificate, or confirming that there has been no change in such information since the dates of the Effective Date Perfection Certificate or the Effective Date Loan Proceeds Note Perfection Certificate, as the case may be, or the date of the most recent certificates delivered pursuant to this Section and (ii) certifying that all Uniform Commercial Code financing statements (excluding fixture filings) or other appropriate filings, recordings or registrations, including all refilings, rerecordings and reregistrations, containing a description of the Collateral required to be set forth therein have been filed of record in each United States governmental, municipal or other appropriate office in each jurisdiction identified pursuant to clause (i) above to the extent necessary to perfect and continue the perfection of the security interests under the applicable Security Documents for a period of not less than 18 months after the date of such certificate (except as noted therein with respect to any continuation statements to be filed within such period).

  • Collateral and Security Section 10.01.

  • Collateral Each of the Banks represents to the Agent and each of the other Banks that it in good faith is not relying upon any "margin stock" (as defined in Regulation U) as collateral in the extension or maintenance of the credit provided for in this Agreement.

  • Data Security Requirements Without limiting Contractor’s obligation of confidentiality as further described in this Contract, Contractor must establish, maintain, and enforce a data privacy program and an information and cyber security program, including safety, physical, and technical security and resiliency policies and procedures, that comply with the requirements set forth in this Contract and, to the extent such programs are consistent with and not less protective than the requirements set forth in this Contract and are at least equal to applicable best industry practices and standards (NIST 800-53).

  • Information Security IET information security management practices, policies and regulatory compliance requirements are aimed at assuring the confidentiality, integrity and availability of Customer information. The UC ▇▇▇▇▇ Cyber-safety Policy, UC ▇▇▇▇▇ Security Standards Policy (PPM Section 310-22), is adopted by the campus and IET to define the responsibilities and key practices for assuring the security of UC ▇▇▇▇▇ computing systems and electronic data.