Common use of The Targets Clause in Contracts

The Targets. Given the relatively modest size of the UK nuclear stockpile, the first principle of UK planning was to make every weapon count. This chapter describes British targeting policies, accommodating Plan A (the NATO coordinated war plan) and Plan B, a National list of countervalue targets – Soviet cities (the maximum threat from limited means). It is argued that there was little difference between Plan A and Plan B, in terms of the consequences of an attack, as many priority military targets were located within the greater boundaries of the major cities. The evolution of targeting policy is discussed, with its eventual concentration on the very largest Soviet cities. The chapter also considers the measures taken to maximise the destructive potential of each weapon in relation to the allocated target (in itself an explanation of the V-Force emphasis on accurate weapon delivery). British nuclear targeting policy was astute and pragmatic. V-Force crews trained to attack Plan A (NATO/SIOP) and Plan B (National) targets. Plan A targets were primarily “counterforce”, such as airfields, ports, missile sites and command and control centres. Plan B “countervalue” targets in the National Plan focussed on the biggest cities, presenting the maximum threat from UK nuclear forces acting alone. In the public arena, Plan B was often discounted as so unlikely as to be hardly worthy of discussion. Yet it remains, to this day, the ultimate foundation of UK military and political power. Inevitably, given Britain’s limited nuclear assets, Plan B targets were punitive: the major centres of population. At the same time, Plan A military targets were often near or within major urban areas and, consequently, as ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2012) has pointed out: “… there was little difference between these and the countervalue (city) targets that were the focus of the National Retaliatory War Plan.”1 Each V-Force crew had at least two Plan A NATO targets, a Plan B National target and a priority QRA target. ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ was Wing Targeting Officer for Waddington’s 24 Vulcans: “There was one QRA target (ALN 100 series), two Plan A (ALN 200 series), one Plan B (ALN 400 series) and one Plan B follow on target (ALN 411 plus).”2 Targets changed annually (Plan A on July 1 and Plan B on January 1), so presenting each crew with fresh 1 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Losing an empire and finding a role, 234. 2 ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, Vulcan Nav/Radar, Wing Targeting Officer; email: 2/4/20. challenges. This cycle allowed for Intelligence updates and changes in targeting policy. Destroying airfields and other military targets might be thought an inadequate response to Britain’s total destruction. Most counterforce targets, however, were in and around the big cities; a Plan A attack would largely destroy the host cities (at least those not already destroyed in earlier missile strikes). A V-bomber counterforce strike would inflict catastrophic countervalue damage. From this perspective, both plans were in harmony. In this respect, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2003) drew attention to an early comment by ▇.▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (1955): “… major air bases are frequently located near cities; troops can be concentrated in cities; and submarine bases are associated with major seaports. Thus, even counterforce operations will inevitably lead to some destruction of Soviet cities.”3 Early V-Force targeting had a counterforce emphasis, with priority given to Soviet Long Range Air Force (LRAF) bomber bases threatening the UK. This was accompanied by countervalue targeting in the National context. Here, the objective was to destroy major urban areas. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ (2018) points to the logic: This was, after all, the purest way to achieve a deterrent effect: to inflict such a level of destruction on a society and state that it might cease to function in any recognisable manner, making the potential gain of any initial aggression seem insignificant and even ridiculous against the disastrous consequences that would follow as a result. In the strategic environment, where the UK’s delivery capabilities were decidedly limited but the power of weapons carried much increased, the attractions of countervalue targeting became steadily more apparent. 4 The Valiant entered service in February 1955. Two months later Bomber Command’s then AOC-in-C, ▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, was asked to comment on his draft Command Directive. He was unimpressed. Attacks on the Soviet long range bomber force had priority. While many air bases were near cities, ▇▇▇▇▇ made it clear in a letter to Air Vice-Marshal ▇.▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ that he preferred the cities proper.5 The British allocation of Plan A targets, under SIOP, evolved over the years, as did the Plan B National target list. These changes reflected, inter alia, a shift in policy from instant and massive nuclear retaliation to “flexible response”. Plan B placed emphasis on an ever smaller number of the largest Soviet cities. While the British definition of levels of damage unacceptable to the Soviets became increasingly modest, this did not solely reflect a steady 3 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, The evolution of nuclear strategy, Third Edition (Basingstoke (UK)/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), citing Colonel ▇.▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, “Counterforce strategy: how we can exploit America’s atomic advantage”, Air Force Magazine (February 1955): 51.