Market Structure Sample Clauses
The Market Structure clause defines the framework and organization of the marketplace in which the parties operate. It typically outlines the types of markets involved (such as primary or secondary markets), the roles of participants, and the mechanisms for trading or exchange. For example, it may specify whether transactions occur on an exchange, over-the-counter, or through other platforms, and set out the rules governing these interactions. The core function of this clause is to ensure all parties have a clear understanding of the operational environment, reducing ambiguity and helping to allocate responsibilities and risks appropriately.
Market Structure. Any PJM member can participate in the Long Term FTR Auction, the Annual FTR Auction and the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions. PJM oversees the process of selling and buying FTRs through FTR Auctions. Market participants purchase FTRs by participating in Long Term, Annual and Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.5 FTRs can also be traded between market participants through bilateral transactions. ARRs may be self scheduled as FTRs for participation only in the Annual FTR Auction. Total FTR supply is limited by the capability of the transmission system to simultaneously accommodate the set of requested FTRs and the numerous combinations of FTRs that are feasible. For the Annual FTR Auction, known transmission outages that are expected to last for two months or more are included in the model, while known outages of five days or more are included in the model for the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions as well as any outages of a shorter duration that PJM determines would cause FTR revenue inadequacy if not modeled.6 But the auction process does not account for the fact that significant transmission outages, which have not been provided to PJM by transmission owners prior to the auction date, will occur during the periods covered by the auctions. Such transmission outages may or may not be planned in advance or may be emergency outages. In addition, it is difficult to model in an annual auction two outages of similar significance and similar duration in different areas which do not overlap in time. The choice of which to model may have significant distributional consequences. The fact that outages are modeled at significantly lower than historical levels results in selling too many FTRs which creates downward pressure on revenues paid to each FTR.
Market Structure. Supply and Demand
Market Structure. Any PJM member can participate in the Long Term FTR Auction, the Annual FTR Auction and the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions.
Market Structure. Supply. Market participants can also sell FTRs. In the first ten months of the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2013 to 2014 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 4,990,310 MW, up from 4,627,335 MW for the same period during the 2012 to 2013 planning period.
Market Structure. Supply. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2015 to 2016 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 4,500,555 MW, up from 3,230,754 MW for the same period during the 2014 to 2015 planning period. • Demand. The total FTR buy bids from the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the 2015 to 2016 planning period increased 0.6 percent from 23,099,689 MW for the same time period of the prior planning period, to 23,243,499 MW. • Patterns of Ownership. For the Monthly Balance of Planning Period Auctions, financial entities purchased 81.7 percent of prevailing flow and
Market Structure. Supply. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction include the St. ▇▇▇▇’s transformer in Dominion and the ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Line in AEP. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2016 to 2017 planning period include the Rockwell- Congress Line in AEP and the ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Line in AEP. Market participants can sell FTRs. In the 2017 to 2020 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 208,405 MW, down from 327,980 in the 2016 to 2017 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2016 to 2017 Annual FTR Auction, total participant sell offers were 378, 431 MW, down from 378,744 MW in the 2015 to 2016 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2016 to 2017 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 3,173,126 MW, up from 2,078,673 MW for the same period during the 2015 to 2016 planning period.
Market Structure. Supply. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the 2012 to 2015 Long Term FTR Auction include the Millville – Old Chapel line, approximately 40 miles northwest of Washington, D.C., and the ▇▇▇▇ Oak Flowgate, approximately 60 miles west of Fort ▇▇▇▇▇, IN. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2011 to 2012 planning period include the Doubs Transformer, approximately 20 miles northwest of Washington, D.C. and the Bartonsville – ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ City line, approximately 60 miles west of Washington, D.C. The geographic location of these constraints is shown in Figure 12-1. Market participants can also sell FTRs. In the 2012 to 2015 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 251,290 MW, up from 177,540 MW during the 2011 to 2014 Long Term FTR Auction. In the Annual FTR Auction for the 2011 to 2012 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 337,510 MW, up from 178,428 MW during the 2010 to 2011 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months (June through December 2011) of the 2011 to 2012 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 3,984,782 MW, up from 2,706,728 MW for the same period during the 2010 to 2011 planning period. • Demand. The PJM tariff specifies that PJM has the authority to limit the maximum number of FTR bids to 5,000 per participant for a monthly auction, or a single round of an annual auction, if necessary to avoid related system performance issues.6 On this basis, PJM currently limits the maximum number of bids that could be submitted by a participant for any individual period in an auction to 10,000 bids. In the 2012 to 2015 Long Term FTR Auction, total FTR buy bids increased 1.3 percent from 400,222 MW to 405,504 MW. In the Annual FTR Auction total FTR buy bids and self scheduled bids increased 6 OA Schedule 1 § 7.3.5(d). 84.8 percent from 1,764,288 MW to 3,260,695 MW. The total FTR buy bids from the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2011 to 2012 (June through December 2011) planning period increased 42.3 percent from 8,973,645 MW, during the same time period of the prior planning period, to 12,767,075 MW. As one of the measures to address underfunding, effective August 5, 2011, PJM no longer allows FTR buy bids to clear with a price of zero unless there is at least one constraint in the auction which affects the FTR path....
Market Structure. To the extent that the MSA restrained market competition, one might expect there to be a rise in market concentration.30 Such an increase may
Market Structure. Supply. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the 2017/2020 Long Term FTR Auction include the St. John’s Transformer in Dominion and the ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Line in AEP. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2017/2018 planning period include the Bunsonville Flowgate in MISO and the Silver Lake-Silver Lake Line in ComEd. In a given auction round, market participants can sell FTRs that they have acquired in preceding auction rounds. In the 2017/2020 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant FTR sell offers were 208,405 MW, down from 327,980 in the 2016/2017 Long Term FTR Auction. In the 2017/2018 Annual FTR Auction, total participant sell offers were 276,844 MW, down from 378,431 MW in the 2016/2017 Annual FTR Auction. In the Monthly Balance of Planning Period FTR Auctions for the first seven months of the 2017/2018 planning period, total participant FTR sell offers were 3,228,291 MW, up from 3,173,126 MW for the same period during the 2016/2017 planning period.
Market Structure. Supply. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the 2014 to 2017 Long Term FTR Auction include the Monticello – East Winamac flowgate, approximately 120 miles north of Indianapolis, IN, and the Cumberland Ave - ▇▇▇▇ flowgate, approximately 100 miles north of Indianapolis, IN. The principal binding constraints limiting the supply of FTRs in the Annual FTR Auction for the 2013 to 2014 planning period include the Cumberland Ave – ▇▇▇▇ flowgate, approximately 100 miles north of Indianapolis, IN and the Beaver Channel - Albany flowgate, approximately 100 miles north of Springfield, IL. The geographic location of these constraints is shown in Figure 13-1. • Market participants can also sell FTRs. In the 2014 to 2017 Long Term FTR Auction, total participant