Mutual Authentication Sample Clauses

Mutual Authentication. In the proposed protocol, the goal of mutual authentication was to ensure that MU and HA are legitimate and to establish an agreed-upon session key between MU and FA for further communications. 1. Mutual authentication between MU and HA:

Mutual Authentication. The proposed scheme provides mutual authentication. Suppose if ℛ dispatches the Ciphertext Ψ1 = ( NON , Ω, Λ, , , ) to ℛ . After receiving the key 1, ▇▇ performs the following computations:

Mutual Authentication. The enhanced scheme provides mutual authentication because legitimate participants verify each other, ensuring strong mutual authentication. This property secures our protocol and allows for the early detection of potential attacks such as replay attacks.

Mutual Authentication. The gate-way node GWN first checks whether the received timestamp T1 is valid as compare to the decrypted one from Di when receiving the message {Di, Ei, T1}. Next, GWN verifies = h(h(IDi, Xk), ri, T1) ? Ei. If both the condition are true, the validity of the user Ui is authenticated by ?

Mutual Authentication. = 1) In the proposed scheme, Si authenticates Ui by checking the validity of equation M3 ? h(M2 C1 SK d). We have demonstrated that the proposed scheme can provide user anonymity and off-line password guessing attack. If an ad- versary replays the former login request message CIDi, V, D, F1, F2, M1 sent to Si by Ui, he/she would fail according to the analysis of section 5.2.5. On the other hand, suppose the adversary forge the login request message to cheat the server, we will find that it is impossible by the analysis of Section 5.2.6.

Mutual Authentication. In above section, we prove that A can generate the session key SK successfully, and impersonate the legitimate vehicle. Therefore, the protocol of ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ et al. cannot achieve key agreement and mutual authentication.

Mutual Authentication. In our proposed protocol, both the UAV and the service provider (USP) can authen-

Mutual Authentication. Mutual authentication enables communicating parties to verify the identity of the other and to exchange a session key. One important tool to achieve authentication is the digital signature (Ford, 1994) (ISO, 1996). The existing GSM only provides a unilateral authentication scheme that ensures only authorized devices gain access to the network. So, the user side is unable to verify the visited network and its home network. In addition, there is no mutual authentication between visited network and home network because it assumes the communication path between them is fully secure. Consequently, impersonation attacks may occur in this unilateral authentication scheme such as a false base station. The UMTS authentication protocol remedies these weaknesses. This eliminates the chance that illegal users make fraudulent phone calls and thwarts fraud (Menezes, et al., 1997).

Mutual Authentication. In the proposed scheme, S authenticates Ui by checking the validity of M3 in the access request. We have shown that the proposed scheme can preserve user anonymity, so Ui’s identity IDi is even secured to the server S but only exposed h(IDi) to S. We have proved that the proposed scheme can resist user impersonation attack. Therefore, it is impossible for an adversary to forge messages to masquerade as ▇▇ in the proposed scheme. To pass the authentication of S, the smart card first needs to take Ui’s identity IDi and password PWi to get through the verification in Step L2 of the login phase. In this Section, we have shown that the proposed scheme can resist offline password guessing attack. Therefore, only the legal user Ui who owns correct IDi and PWi can pass the authentication of S. On the other hand, Ui authenticates S by explicitly checking whether the other party communicating with can compute the valid M2 or not. Since MS does not know the values of IDi corresponding to Ui and x corresponding to S, only the legitimate S could compute the correct M2=h(SK W C1). From the above analysis, we conclude that the proposed scheme can achieve mutual authentication.