Performance Penalty Clause Samples

A Performance Penalty clause imposes financial or contractual consequences on a party if they fail to meet specified performance standards or deadlines. Typically, this clause outlines the criteria for acceptable performance, the method for measuring compliance, and the penalties—such as monetary fines or reduced payments—that will be enforced if obligations are not met. Its core practical function is to incentivize timely and satisfactory performance, thereby protecting the interests of the party expecting the service or deliverable and providing a clear remedy if standards are not achieved.
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Performance Penalty. In the event ASMA fails and/or omits to submit the monthly report, the Government shall have the right to impose the performance penalty by deducting from the fee payable to ASMA .
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Performance Penalty. 10.1 Background CONTRACTOR and CITY agree that optimizing collection performance requires that both CONTRACTOR and CITY meet their obligations under this Agreement. Based on CONTRACTOR's projections of increased collections, and CITY's provision of historical financial and reimbursement performance information, CITY has established a Minimum Threshold as a collection performance standard. 10.2 Definitions for Performance Penalty:
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Performance Penalty. (a) If Sales Agent is in material breach of its obligations under either the Purchase Agreement or this Agreement and the KSMO Parties are not then in material default under the Purchase Agreement or this Agreement, and such default by Sales Agent shall not have been cured within twenty-five (25) days following written notice from the KSMO Parties of such default (or within such longer period as may reasonably be required to cure such default if not reasonably capable of being cured within twenty-five (25) days and Sales Agent shall have diligently begun working to cure such default within such twenty-five (25) day period) (an “Uncured Material Breach”), in lieu of any right by Licensee to terminate the Purchase Agreement or this Agreement as a result of an Uncured Material Breach, Sales Agent shall owe to the KSMO Parties a performance penalty calculated as follows (the “Performance Penalty”): (i) If an Uncured Material Breach exists on a day Sales Agent is required to pay Licensee the Licensee Revenue Share as provided in Schedule 3.1, the Performance Penalty shall be the amount of the monthly JSA Fee (which shall be paid in addition to the Licensee Revenue Share). (ii) If such Uncured Material Breach continues to exist on the next succeeding day Sales Agent is required to pay Licensee the Licensee Revenue Share as provided in Schedule 3.1, the Performance Penalty shall be two times the amount of the JSA Fee and the Performance Penalty shall be increased in such manner for each succeeding month that the Uncured Material Breach remains uncured as of the day Sales Agent is required to pay Licensee the Licensee Revenue Share as provided in Schedule 3.1. (b) In the event that Sales Agent shall be obligated to pay any damages hereunder with respect to any indemnity claim by the KSMO Parties (other than with respect to a claim concerning a failure to pay the Licensee Revenue Share in accordance with Schedule 3.1) and Sales Agent shall be obligated to pay or shall have paid a Performance Penalty with respect to the events giving rise to such damages, then the amount of such damages payable by Sales Agent shall be reduced by, and to the extent of, the amount of the Performance Penalty paid to the KSMO Parties less any separate damages payable to the KSMO Parties with respect to such events pursuant to the Purchase Agreement.
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Performance Penalty. The Company shall pay an annual Performance Penalty based upon the value of the airspace lost as a result of the Operational Density calculation results achieved by the Company for the contract year, per Table 3.2 and as further detailed in Appendix 3. When the Company achieves the Penalty Parameter Operational Density shown in Table 3.2, the value of the airspace lost during the year will be calculated as the difference between volume consumed at the achieved Operational Density and the volume that would have been consumed at the Point of Calculation density. The volume of airspace lost will be converted to tons of airspace lost using the achieved Operational density. For the Class I MSW Landfill, the Performance Penalty will consist of a 20% penalty applied to the tons of airspace lost multiplied by the current published Lee County MSW gate rate at the Facility. If the MSW gate rate at the Facility changes during the calculation period, the Performance Penalty will be calculated separately for tons received under each rate. For the Class III Landfill, the Performance Penalty will consist of a 20% penalty applied to the tons of airspace saved multiplied by the current published Lee County Class III gate rate at the Facility. If the Class III gate rate at the Facility changes during the calculation period, the Performance Penalty will be calculated separately for tons received under each rate.
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Performance Penalty. The penalty for Contractor's failure to meet ID Card Maintenance (Ongoing) Performance Commitment shall be the amount shown in Attachment A.
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Performance Penalty. In the event that Operator does not meet the Percentage of Product Target goal set out in this Section 9.04 for a given six-month period, Operator will pay a penalty to Owner equal to [***] of the Operator Fee earned during the previous six months; provided, h()’TJ)ever, that in the first such six-month period no penalty will be due unless the Facility has been proven capable of production at [***] of the Product Target. Notwithstanding this provision, no Performance Penalty will apply when products or production fails to meet contract requirements for any reason unless Operator is solely responsible for such loss of product or production. The Performance Penalty described in this Section is meant to constitute liquidated damages and is the Owner’s sole remedy for the Operator’s failure to meet the Product Target.
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Performance Penalty a) Integrated project performance of minimum solar energy to be generated 1.52MU/MWp annually with degradation of 1% for any reason, from second year onwards. If generated units fall short, then Rs.6.50 per unit of short fall will be deducted from WBPDCL payments every year up to 5th year. b) Penalty will be deducted from retained Performance Security but if Performance Security ended then penalty will be recovered by invoking PBG c) WBPDCL reserves the right to adjust any excess / short payment made in the earlier bills, at the time of making payments.
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Performance Penalty. (a) ▇▇▇▇▇▇’s failure to return the RSS Unit or Units to service within the Repair Time will result in the application of the Performance Penalty as set forth in Section 5.4 (b) below. For purposes of the application of the Performance Penalty, the Repair Time shall commence on the day that Cayuga receives NYSEG’s written notification to Cayuga that NYSEG will pay the full amount, or a lesser amount mutually agreed to by the Parties, of the Additional Expenditures. Cayuga’s failure to return an RSS Unit to service after receipt of the Additional Expenditures from NYSEG shall be a material breach of this Agreement solely if Cayuga fails to exercise Good Utility Practices and act in accordance with the NYISO Tariff in returning an RSS Unit to service.
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Performance Penalty. If the Uptime falls below [*] in any [*] during the Term of this Agreement, then FORTUNE shall have, for a period of sixty (60) days following the determination of ▇▇▇▇▇▇'▇ failure to meet the Uptime standard for the second such month, the right to terminate this Agreement upon the provision of thirty (30) days written notice to ▇▇▇▇▇▇'▇.
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Related to Performance Penalty

  • Performance Pay In accordance with Section 8 of the General Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2020-2021, contingent upon the availability of funds and at the Agency Head’s discretion, each agency is authorized to grant merit pay increases based on the employee’s exemplary performance, as evidenced by a performance evaluation conducted pursuant to Rule 60L-35, Florida Administrative Code.

  • Performance Measure Grantee will adhere to the performance measures requirements documented in

  • Performance Award You are hereby awarded, on the Grant Date, a Performance Award with a target value of [AMOUNT].

  • Performance Goal (a) Subject to the following sentence, the Performance Goal is set out in Appendix A hereto, which Appendix A is incorporated by reference herein and made a part hereof. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the provisions of Section 13 or any other provision of this Agreement to the contrary, the Committee reserves the right to unilaterally change or otherwise modify the Performance Goal in any manner whatsoever (including substituting a new Performance Goal). If the Committee exercises such discretionary authority to any extent, the Committee shall provide the Grantee with a new Appendix A in substitution for the Appendix A attached hereto, and such new Appendix A and the Performance Goal set out therein (rather than the Appendix A attached hereto and the Performance Goal set out therein) shall in all events apply for all purposes of this Agreement. (b) Depending upon the extent, if any, to which the Performance Goal has been achieved, and subject to compliance with the requirements of Section 4, each PSU shall entitle the Grantee to receive, at such time as is determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 5, between 0 and 2.0 Shares for each PSU. The Committee shall, as soon as practicable following the last day of the Performance Period, certify (i) the extent, if any, to which, in accordance with Appendix A, the Performance Goal has been achieved with respect to the Performance Period and (ii) the number of whole and/or partial Shares, if any, which, subject to compliance with the vesting requirements of Section 4, the Grantee shall be entitled to receive with respect to each PSU (with such number of whole and/or partial Shares being hereafter referred to as the “Share Delivery Factor”). Such certification shall be final, conclusive and binding on the Grantee, and on all other persons, to the maximum extent permitted by law.

  • Performance Goals A. The Trust and State Street have developed mutually acceptable performance goals dated March 1, 2011 , and as may be amended from time to time, regarding the manner in which they expect to deliver and receive the services under this Agreement (hereinafter referred to as “Service Level Agreement”). The parties agree that such Service Level Agreement reflects performance goals and any failure to perform in accordance with the provisions thereof shall not be considered a breach of contract that gives rise to contractual or other remedies. It is the intention of the parties that the sole remedy for failure to perform in accordance with the provisions of the Service Level Agreement, or any dispute relating to performance goals set forth in the Service Level Agreement, will be a meeting of the parties to resolve the failure pursuant to the consultation procedure described in Sections V. B. and V.C. below. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the parties hereby acknowledge that any party’s failure (or lack thereof) to meet the provisions of the Service Level Agreement, while not in and of itself a breach of contract giving rise to contractual or other remedies, may factor into the Trust’s reasonably determined belief regarding the standard of care exercised by State Street hereunder.