Correctness Clause Samples
The Correctness clause establishes that the information, representations, or statements provided by a party are accurate and truthful. In practice, this clause typically requires each party to confirm that all facts, documents, or disclosures made in connection with the agreement are correct and not misleading. Its core function is to ensure reliability and trust between parties by holding them accountable for the accuracy of their communications, thereby reducing the risk of disputes arising from false or incomplete information.
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Correctness. If a process with identifier i performs Broadcast(m) in superround r ≥ T , then every cor- rect process performs Accept(m, i) during superround r.
Correctness. For all ID, if the leader L is honest and all honest parties are activated on ID, all honest parties would output for ID.
Correctness. In this section we prove the correctness of transaction execution by proving the following theorem. Theorem 1 Transaction execution preserves Invariant 1. Proof By assumption the invariant held before the execution of a transaction. At all sites where the transaction is not committed, the data values, history log, and reception vectors remain unchanged. Moreover data values, history log, and reception vectors of all objects not written by the transaction remain unchanged. transaction coordinator.
Correctness. If Eve is passive, then Pr[kA = kB]= 1.
Correctness. If the dealer is honest and inputs secret m in AVSS-Sh, then: If all honest parties are activated to run AVSS-Sh on ID, all honest parties would output in the AVSS-Sh instance; The value m∗ reconstructed by any honest party in the corresponding AVSS-Rec instance must be equal to m, for all ID.
Correctness. With the formal validation tool ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇-▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ Logic (BAN-logic) [27], we provide the proof of correctness of the proposed scheme in this section. Let U be the user, S represent the sensor node and GWN denote the gateway node. We demonstrate that a session key can be created successfully after the process of mutual authentication among S and U. Now, the basic notations of BAN-logic are given below: • P |≡ X: P believes X.
Correctness. For proving the first part, it is clear that (i) the honest dealer must collect at least n f valid digital signature for (C ) from distinct parties to form valid Π and (ii) every honest party can eventually wait the shares of A(x) and B(x) as well as the same C . This implies that all honest parties can eventually broadcast the same Cipher messages, so they would broadcast the same Echo messages and the same Ready messages, thus finally outputting in the AVSS-Sh instance. For proving the second party, it is easy to see that (i) any honest party must output a ciphertext c same to the ciphertext computed by the honest sender and (ii) all honest parties must receive the same hash h of the commitment C to A(x), where A(x) is a polynomial chosen by the honest deader. Recall that we have proven that all honest parties can reconstruct a message c A(0), which exactly is m because c computed by the honest sender is m A(0).
Correctness. Honestly generated money states verify under their serial number. That is,