Separation of Powers Sample Clauses
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Separation of Powers. An Analysis of the Doctrine from Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution. The Hague: ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, and ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇. 2003 [1788]. The Federalist Papers, edited by ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. New York: Signet Classic. ▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇., and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. 2002. The Relationship between Politicians and Administrators: A Logic of Disharmony. Public Administration 80 (4): 733-750. ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇. 2004. Ethics and Administrative Discretion in a Unified Administration: A Burkean Perspective. Administration & Society 35 (6): 701-716. ▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. 1989. The ▇▇▇▇▇/▇▇▇▇▇ Debate: A Review and Update. Public Administration Quarterly 12 (4): 437-451.
Separation of Powers the roles of the main governance bodies
Separation of Powers. Separate institutions for the administration of justice shall be established for the NorthEast, and judicial powers shall be vested in such institutions. The ISGA shall take appropriate measures to ensure the independence of the judges. Subject to Clauses 4 (Human Rights) and 22 (Settlement of Disputes), of this Agreement, the institutions created under this clause shall have sole and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve all disputes concerning the interpretation and implementation of this agreement and any other disputes arising in or under this agreement or any provision thereof.
Separation of Powers. The power of government is divided between three branches: executive, legislative, and judicial
Separation of Powers. To prevent tyranny and better protect the ideals of justice and individual liberties, constitutional democracies are founded upon the core principles of separate and independent government func- tions combined with checks and balances. The U.S. Congressional Research Service describes the historical intent of separation of powers as drafted into the U.S. Constitution: The framers viewed human nature as inherently bad, and sus- pected that the natural inclination of men is to abuse power. Tyranny, to them, was “the accumulation of all powers, legisla- tive, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands.” To separate the functions of government into independent branches was necessary but not sufficient. Each branch would also need the ability to stand as a check against the others. No branch, how- ever, would possess an overruling influence over the others, and each would be provided with the necessary means to resist encroachment from the others.137 In the 47th paper of The Federalist, ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ explained, “The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive and judici- ary, in the hands of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elected, may justly be pronounced the very defi- nition of tyranny.”138 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ also strongly supported the separation of powers between the three branches, and ex- pressed most concern regarding independence of the judiciary: 136. Id. (emphasis added). 137. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44334, SEPARATION OF POW- ERS: AN OVERVIEW (2016). 138. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇). ▇▇▇▇] ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ INTERAGENCY AGREEMENTS 65 “The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited Constitution.”139 Similarly, U.S. Senator ▇▇▇ ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇., who was chairman of the Senate select committee that investigated the Watergate scandal, wrote: [J]udicial independence is the strongest safeguard against the exercise of tyrannical power by men who want to live above the law, rather than under it. The separation of powers concept as understood by the founding fathers assumed the existence of a judicial system free from outside influence of whatever kind and from whatever source, and further assumed that each indi- vidual judge would be free from coercion even from his own brethren.140 In the instances when branch functions are shared the original intent at the country’s founding was that such overlap exists for the purpose of checks and balances: Madison recogn...
Separation of Powers. 32.1 The power duties and obligation of the Landlord in the exercise of its functions or the exercise of its discretion as a local planning authority, highway authority or building regulation authority or as local authority under any other statutory provision and the rights statutes bye-laws orders and regulations of the Landlord under public and private statutes bye-laws orders and regulations may be as fully and effectively exercised in relation to the Property or any part of it as if the Landlord was not a party to this lease
32.2 The actions or omissions of the Landlord in its capacity as local planning authority, local highway authority and/or local authority are irrelevant to any actions or omissions of the Landlord in its capacity under this lease and to the exercise by the Landlord of any rights or obligations under this lease and any consents approvals or decisions of the local planning authority, local highway authority and/or local authority do not bind the Landlord in its capacity under this lease .
Separation of Powers. Receiver does not dispute, and hence concedes, that she never filed reports otherwise required by §447.539, that she never delivered the funds otherwise required by §447.543, that the moneys are being held to make refunds to utility customers (L.F.75), or that the moneys have been held longer than the statutory abandonment period. (Rec.Brf., 18). Thus, receiver concedes that the law has been violated. Nevertheless, receiver argues that, assuming the Treasurer has the authority to enforce her duty to receive unclaimed property, the circuit judge has superior authority to dispose of the funds (including interest thereon) in violation of the law. She cites cases invoking the separation of powers doctrine, but that doctrine is inapplicable here because the UPA does not permit the Treasurer to exercise powers constitutionally assigned to the judiciary.