Emphasis added Clause Samples
The 'Emphasis added' clause indicates that any highlighting, bolding, underlining, or other forms of emphasis within quoted material has been inserted by the party presenting the document, rather than appearing in the original source. For example, if a contract excerpt is reproduced in a legal brief and certain words are bolded or italicized, the 'Emphasis added' note clarifies that these modifications were made to draw attention to specific language. This clause ensures transparency and prevents misunderstandings about what was originally emphasized in the source material, thereby maintaining the integrity of quoted content.
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Emphasis added. The Court of Appeals then continued its analysis: Our starting point is that the MSA [Master Services Agreement] is a lease and a contract for services. We have only applied the economic-loss doctrine to contracts for goods, and we have specifically declined to apply the doctrine to service contracts. See ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ v ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 209 Mich App 266; 530 NW2d 171 (1995) (reversing summary disposition on basis that the economic-loss doctrine was wrongly applied to a contract for services); Quest Diagnostics, Inc, 254 Mich App at 379 (“This Court has declined to apply the economic[- ]loss doctrine where the claim emanates from a contract for services.”). Because the MSA was a services contract, the economic-loss doctrine does not apply. See ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, 439 Mich at 527-528. The arbitrator reached the correct conclusion (that the economic-loss doctrine does not apply), even if it did so for the wrong reason (that the parties could not have contemplated the conversion at the time of the MSA's execution). His refusal to apply the economic-loss doctrine—albeit for the wrong reason—was not in contravention of controlling law. The doctrine has only been applied to the sale of goods, and never to a contract for services. Accordingly, this Court agrees with Precision that the economic loss doctrine does not apply to the service agreement between Precision and ADP; therefore, the economic loss doctrine does not bar Precision’s claims for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion. This, however, does not end this Court’s analysis. The Court must conduct a “separate-and distinct analysis.” In Bathtub, the Court of Appeals found that the conversion claim was nevertheless barred because it did not impose duties separate and distinct from the duties existing under the contract. Bathtub, supra citing ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇'▇ Constr Corp v Mich Bell Tel Co, 454 Mich 65, (1997). In doing so, the Bathtub Court detailed the law relating to the separate-and-distinct analysis set forth in ▇▇▇▇ v ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 347 Mich 550 (1956), that was followed up by the Michigan Supreme Court in ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇'▇ Constr Corp v Mich Bell Tel Co, 454 Mich 65, 83-85 (1997). The Bathtub Court explained: In ▇▇▇▇ v ▇▇▇▇▇▇, 347 Mich at 559, our Supreme Court first addressed whether a plaintiff could maintain an action in tort arising out of a breach of contract. There, an orchard worker (the promisor) agreed to care for an orchard under an oral contract, but failed to perform certain care and maintenance that would otherwise amount to ne...
Emphasis added. [89] It is evident that at the time payment was made to LCaribbean GOSL was fully seized of the assignment of the receivables payable from the Project and such these receivables could only have been categorized as a payable to KCL. [90] In First Vancouver Finance v. M.N.R the question for the court was whether a factor was entitled to recover monies paid to the Minister of National Revenue from receivables which were purchased prior to the Minister issuing a request for statutory garnishment, in connection with these receivables. The court ruled that monies owing on accounts factored prior to the date of the request for garnishment were not subject to the garnishment, however accounts factored after that date were effectively intercepted by it. In other words once the receivables were factored before the Minister issued a request to garnish, the National Revenue was prevented from asserting an interest in these invoices. Consequently, a declaration was made confirming the factor’s entitlement to the funds already paid to the Minister. [91] On this point I conclude that the funds paid to LCaribbean were indeed the property of KCL, which ought not to have been utilized as if it were the property of AMSL. Therefore GOSL is liable to pay to KCL the remaining sums under the Notices.
Emphasis added. The SME notes that the three aforementioned BSS documents contain helpful information, consistent with the Agreement, to increase BSS workers’ awareness of the shift from residential, and how to access the HCBS to support that redirection. The SME notes one error in the Pathway to Children’s Mental Health document, specific to CMCR in the sub header 3.2 Children’s Crisis and Referral Line and Mobile Mental Health Crisis:
Emphasis added. The Court has found that the Brusers violated the CCD by not paying the Trustee Fee as determined by the state court. Under the CCD, therefore, BOH, as Lessor, is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.10 BOH may also be entitled to prejudgment and postjudgment interest. “The general rule is that ‘[i]n diversity actions, state law determines the rate of prejudgment interest, and postjudgment interest is governed by 10 Given the 7/21/15 Order and the Stipulation, the instant decision addresses a claim brought only by BOH. To the extent that any other parties to this action believe that they are entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs, each must file a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Rule 54.3 of the Local Rules of Practice of the United States District Court for the District of Hawai`i (“Local Rules”). federal law.’” ▇▇▇ ▇. Adalian, Civil No. 09-00226 JMS-BMK, 2015 WL 477268, at *7 n.7 (D. Hawai`i Feb. 5, 2015) (alteration in Jou) (quoting Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. United Computer Sys., Inc., 98 F.3d 1206, 1209 (9th Cir. 1996)). The Court, however, need not address these issues, or the specific amount of attorneys’ fees, until BOH files the appropriate motion, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d) and Local Rule 54.3. Likewise, the Court need not address any taxable costs unless and until BOH files the appropriate motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) and Local Rule 54.2.
Emphasis added. 95 Ibid., 15. An additional philosophical conundrum arises from ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ distinction between truth and effectiveness. Even as ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ himself is considered one of the twelve “most effective” preachers in the English-speaking world, he insists that he has no concern for listener response. He writes, “Next Sunday, if once again my congregation appears to be unmoved and unimpressed by my homiletical efforts, I intend to ascribe their lack of response to God! Our job as preachers is to stand up and speak the truth as God gives it to us; congregational response is God’s business.”96 Such a statement, even if hyperbolic, proceeds upon the a priori decision to separate truth from effectiveness. Might not an ineffective sermon point just as clearly to truth as falsehood? Compare ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ preaching during the 1st Great Awakening with the “Word of Faith” prosperity preaching; both are effective by their own standards. Rather than drawing proclamation closer to theology (the Word of God preached is the Word of God), binary commitments unintentionally enforce the very same anthropology that ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ wishes to overcome. He writes, “We preachers are to worry more about what is being said and how well we can replicate that word than we are to worry about whether or not what is being said in the Gospel is being heard in the world.”97 Whatever the cause of our worry, is not such an effort a human effort? Would it not be more theological to bear witness to God’s Word in the biblical text and in the world, to preach God’s Word and trust God to communicate the truth to be found therein as well as any human response? Neither truth nor effectiveness ought to guide preaching because neither is within the confines of human agency.
Emphasis added. That demand is acceded to by point 3 of Section C. The period allowed for the transmission of reasoned opinions is increased, in this instance, from the eight weeks provided for by Article 6 of Protocol (No 2) to 12 weeks. Under the procedure, where reasoned opinions on the non-compliance of a draft legislative act with the principle of subsidiarity represent more than 55 per cent of the votes allocated to national Parliaments,6 the item will be included on the Council agenda for a comprehensive discussion; following which “the representatives of the Member States acting in their capacity as members of the Council will discontinue their consideration of the draft legislative act in question unless the draft is amended to accommodate the concerns expressed in the reasoned opinions”. The implementation technique, therefore, entails a Council conduct agreement: the members of the Council would, in the prescribed circumstances, discontinue discussion of the proposal and refrain from voting on it. The envisaged obligation appears to me to be fully compatible with EU law, and hence legally binding, since there is nothing in the Treaties that requires the Council to proceed to the adoption of a given proposal, supposing that the requisite majority is available. In my opinion, it is arguable that once the HSG Decision is in force, the adoption of a legislative measure in defiance of the red card procedure will constitute an infringement of an essential procedural requirement, and hence grounds for the annulment of the measure under Article 263 TFEU.
Emphasis added. The contract documents affirmatively indicate that shore protection structures consisting of rubble and riprap would be present near the Oxy-Chemical Dock. By employing the very dredging practice that the Specifications advised against—“[e]xcessive[ly] cutting outside the side slope lines and grades,” JX 2 (Specs) at 118, ¶ 3.5.2—plaintiff did not act as a reasonably prudent contractor. Further, when preparing the bid estimate for the Upper Bayou Project, ▇▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ anticipated that the Millennium would encounter “rock, . . . ri[p]ra[p] from shore protection projects,” and other “common types” of obstructions. JX 98A (▇▇▇▇▇▇ Dep.), at 222:22–24. Thus, the conditions encountered by the dredge at the Oxy-Chemical Dock, were not reasonably unforeseeable. Accordingly, plaintiff has failed to establish that the conditions at the Oxy-Chemical Dock constitute a differing site condition.
Emphasis added. Except as expressly provided herein, the Shareholder Agreement shall continue in full force and effect.
Emphasis added. Therefore, under the plain language of the statute, the effect of rejection is defined by reference to the breach status. As explained in ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 Minn. L. Rev. 227, 244 (1989), [T]he trustee inherits from the pre-bankruptcy debtor a contract created by nonbankruptcy law. The statutory option to "assume or reject" means exactly what the Code says it means: the option to perform or breach the contract, the same option every contract party has under nonbankruptcy law. It follows that the trustee is prima facie in the same position as any nonbankruptcy contract party, except when specific bankruptcy principles and rules require a different result. Thus, a breach of contract does not automatically result in the contract's termination.6 Instead, the contract remains 6 The trustee contends that under Sea Harvest v. Riviera Land Co., 868 F.2d 1o77, 1o8o (9th Cir. 1989), the effect of re¡ection is always termination. In Sea Harvest, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the re¡ection of a lease of nonresidential real property under § 365 was the same as termination of the lease. In support of its ruling, the Sea Harvest court noted that § 365(d)(4) required that upon re¡ection, the trustee immediately surrender the leased premises. The court stated that "surrender of property ... has the effect of terminating the enterprise that operates there." There is no analogous surrender provision in § 365 regarding contracts, and Sea Harvest is distinguishable on that basis. I believe Sea Harvest should be narrowly construed. A broad reading would be inconsistent with the express language of the Code defining the effect of re¡ection as a breach, as well as state law defining the consequences of a breach. The trustee argues that the final clause of § 365(d) is not intended to treat leases differently from contracts, but merely makes explicit that termination of a lease requires surrender of the premises. He reasons that three subsections of § 365 [(h), (i) and (n)] give the non-debtor party certain options which are inconsistent with termination, and therefore concludes that in all other cases the effect of re¡ection is termination. I disagree regarding the inference that should be drawn from the inclusion of those subsections. I believe that the subsections referred to by the trustee are intended as exceptions to the rule that state law defines the effect of a breach. The exceptions are intended to assure that the no...