▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ Clause Samples
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. 123 under the original partnership arose in 1930 and was, therefore, barred by prescription and that there was no evidence to- establish a fresh partnership. The only question that requires decision is whether the retirem ent of FoPEeka from the partnership operated in law as a dissolution of the partnership or whether the partnership continued under the agreem ent o f M arch 5, 1927, as betw een the plaintiff and the defendant ? In 1929, Fonseka com m enced proceedings against the defendant claim ing his share o f the profits under the agreement. ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ did not ask for a dissolution o f the partnership. This case, according to the plaintiff’s evidence, 'w as settled on the footing that the plaintiff and defendant bought up ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇’ s rights for B s. 3,000. The plaintiff apparently with difficulty liquidated his share o f this sum b y driblets. The m atter is o f course governed b y the Partnership A ct (1890) (53 and 54 V iet, o- 39) w hich is in force in Ceylon by virtue o f section 3 o f the Civil L a w Ordinance (Cap. 66). Sections 32 and 33 o f the A ct prescribe in w hat m anner a partnership is dissolved. E etirem ent o f a partner is not form ulated as operating in law to produce a dissolution. On the other hand, section 4 6 o f the A ct is worded as fo llo w s: — “ The rules o f equity and o f com m on law applicable to partnership, shall continue in force except so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions o f this A ct. ” I t would seem that prior to the enactm ent of the Partnership A ct, 1890, a partnership at com m on law w ould be dissolved b y the retirem ent o f a partner. Can it be said that the rule o f com m on law is inconsist e n t w ith the provisions of Sections 32 & 33 o f the A ct ? M ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ in support o f his contention that the partnership was dissolved relies on the
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. ▇. ▇▇▇▇▇▇ are the sole trustees and lifetime beneficiaries of the Trust.
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the rights of the Participant upon a Change of Control (as defined in the Plan) shall be as set forth in section 9 of the Plan on the date hereof., in lieu of the vesting schedule set forth in Schedule 1. If as a result of the Change of Control, the Common Stock is exchanged for or converted into a different form of equity security and/or the right to receive other property (including cash), the Option may be exercised, to the maximum extent practicable, in the same form.
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. Executive also specifically acknowledges that his service as a director beyond the expiration of his current term in 2004 is subject to Executive's re-nomination as a director candidate by the Nominating and Governance Committee of the Company's Board of Directors and the election by shareholders, neither of which events are guaranteed by this Separation Agreement.
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. The Law of Waiver, Variation, and Estoppel (Oxford University Press, 3rd Ed, 2012) (“▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇”) (at paras 2.42–2.43), to be instructive: A rigid formal adherence to the requirements of variation creates difficulties in practice. Such difficulties have been mitigated by two mechanisms for variation of a contract without the express consent of the parties to, or consideration for, that variation. The first mechanism is clearly established and involves construing certain agreements as if the parties had agreed to permit certain types of variation to those agreements. … The common law allows agreements permitting variation in two cases. First, when the parties incorporate within the contract a set of rules themselves providing for their own variation or amendment. … Second, where the parties have either expressly or impliedly agreed that one or both of them should have the power to vary the agreement … that party will have that power. [emphasis added in italics and bold italics] Applying these principles to the present arrangement under the Subcontract, cl 14.2 of the Subcontract makes it possible to vary the Subcontract even if no additional consideration is provided, where both parties provide prior written consent to the proposed variation. 115 The plaintiff relies on the extract from ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ cited in ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and says that the present case falls within the first mechanism for varying a contract without consideration, ie, construing the contract as if the parties had agreed to permit certain types of variation to those agreements. Put another way, this amounts to a submission that the parties agreed in cl 9.3 of the CLA on a set of rules governing how the CLA could be varied in a manner which would bind both parties. 116 I digress to note that the position taken by ▇▇▇▇ ▇ in Benlen accepts that it is permissible for parties to agree now to be bound by a future variation which is not supported by fresh consideration, ie, consideration given again at the time of the variation. I too accept that that outcome is conceptually permissible. 117 Allowing a contractual clause to have this effect is not an inroad on the doctrine of consideration and does not amount to enforcing a variation without consideration. This is because the consideration for the clause, given when the parties entered into the agreement in which the clause resides, suffices by the parties’ agreement to supply consideration for all future variations. To use the language of the te...
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. The supportive remarks of ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇, Real Estate Consultants, were quoted by the Rapporteur - “From our understanding of the deal currently proposed we believe that this is an advantageous balance for the States of Jersey and in the circumstances the profit margin agreed with the developer of 13% is reasonable.” However, given the concerns that were being expressed by States’ members over the 150-year lease and the questions raised about the value of the land being passed over to the private sector for such a long period, should not the Policy and Resources Committee have also quoted the following advice? “There, are, however, a number of issues relating to the structuring of the head lease, the underlease to be taken by the States of Jersey, the occupational leases, the development agreement and the car parking which will need to be resolved as the negotiations evolve in order to ensure that the capital value of the investment is underpinned in a manner currently envisaged.” (13.5, p.9)
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ acknowledge that neither of them have relied upon any statement, representation, omission made or documentation provided by the other party or the Broker(s), its
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ own beneficially and of record the shares of True Fiction free and clear of any liens and encumbrances.
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇. ▇ AFFILIATES ARE NOT LIABLE IN CONTRACT, TORT, NEGLIGENCE, STRICT LIABILITY OR BY STATUTE OR OTHERWISE, FOR ANY DAMAGES WHATSOEVER WITH RESPECT TO THIS AGREEMENT OR THE USE OF THE CLIENT DATA OR DELIVERABLES, WHETHER DIRECT, INDIRECT, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, EXEMPLARY, PUNITIVE, CONSEQUENTIAL, COLLATERAL, OR INCIDENTAL, FOR DAMAGES FOR LOSS OF OR CORRUPTION OF DATA OR INFORMATION, LOSS OF PROFITS, LOSS OF USE, LOSS OF OR INTERRUPTION OF BUSINESS OR LOSS OF ANTICIPATED SAVINGS. THE FOREGOING LIMITATION OF LIABILITY DOES NOT LIMIT ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ AND ▇▇▇▇▇’▇ AFFILIATES LIABILITY FOR ANY CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DEATH, BODILY INJURY, OR TANGIBLE DAMAGE TO PROPERTY.
▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇ knew that they would receive millions of dollars in illegal kickback payments from Privinvest in connection with the EMATUM loan while employed by Credit Suisse; (2) Firm 1 had expressly warned Credit Suisse about Privinvest and Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1’s history of “corruption and bribery”; and (3) a senior Credit Suisse executive had previously said “no” to Pearse to the combination of Privinvest Co-Conspirator 1 and Mozambique in November 2012.