Lack of transparency Clause Samples

Lack of transparency. The research in this thesis has showed that one of the consequences of informality is the lack of transparency it can lead to. The lack of transparency in itself is not a formal obstacle for annulment but makes it more difficult to initiate an annulment process in practice. The democratic system in the EU provides for transparency to make it possible for the public and different institutions to hold policy makers accountable.233 By not concluding the agreements in a transparent way this can result in the policy makers are not being held responsible for their actions. When stating that informality leads to a lack of transparence this is based foremost on two scenarios which have been noted in this thesis. First, the parliament is kept out of the conclusion process by not being invited to consent on the agreement and by not 233 Judgement of the Court 24 June 2014, Parliament v Council (Mauritius), C-658/11, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2025, para. 81 and ▇▇▇▇▇,‘ The EU-Turkey Statement: A Treaty that violates Democracy (part 2)’ being informed about the process. The Second scenario is the role the European Council had in the conclusion of the Statement.

Lack of transparency. Transparency describes something that is easy to perceive or detect, and is open to scrutiny. In contrast, non-transparency can be illustrated with the metaphor of a black box: a complex system or device whose internal workings are hidden or not readily understood.210 In the context of data-driven decision-making, the black box metaphor stands for outcomes that emerge without satisfactory explanation. Transparency is the second value at risk in the era of the data-driven economy. Although big data promises to make the world more transparent, its collection is invisible and its tools and techniques 202 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇, ‘Worker Privacy in a Digitalized World under European Law’ 330. 203 Ibid. 204 ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ and others, ‘WP1 Mapping the Scene: D1.2 Report on the Analysis of Framework Conditions (Deliverable for the EuDEco H2020 Project)’ (2015) 30 <▇▇▇▇▇://▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇/binaries/content/assets/rechtsgeleerdheid/instituut-voor- metajuridica/d1.2_analysisofframeworkconditions-v1_2015-08-31-1.pdf> accessed 14 June 2018. 205 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2013) 33. 206 Porat and Strahilevitz (2014) 1440. 207 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2010). 208 ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇. and ▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, ‘Facebook is quietly buying information from data brokers about its users’ offline lives’ Business Insider (30 December 2016) <▇▇▇▇://▇▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇/facebook-data-brokers-2016- 12?r=UK&IR=T> accessed 14 June 2018. 209 ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (2010) 21. 210 <▇▇▇▇▇://▇▇.▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇▇.▇▇▇/definition/black_box> accessed on 9 January 2017. opaque, curtained off by layers of physical, legal, and technical protection.211 Non-transparent processing of data occurs in all three stages of the data-driven value chain: when data is acquired, when it is analysed, and when it is used. To illustrate the problem, three examples are given below: privacy policies, algorithmic black box, and the cloud computing black box. Privacy policies (notices). The ubiquitous and automated collection of data in the data-driven economy is by definition opaque. Law requires data collectors to draft privacy policies to explain in what ways and under what circumstances personal data is collected, used, and shared. However, it has been shown that the objectives of privacy policies are flawed as people cannot understand the complex legalistic language, and policies are not specific enough to plausibly present what an individual actually consents to.212 Algorithmic black box. To extract useful patterns and create profiles,...

Lack of transparency. The OECD (1998) points out that although low or nominal taxes are a necessary trait to identifying jurisdictions as tax ▇▇▇▇▇▇, it is not sufficient. Low or nominal tax on income makes tax ▇▇▇▇▇▇ interesting to non-residents. It is, however, the combination with the second and third feature of the definition that makes tax evasion possible. The OECD (1998) explains that the lack of effective exchange of information is present when a jurisdiction acts in a way that halts the exchange of tax related information with other governments. As OECD (1998) points out, this can be facilitated through laws or “administrative practices” (OECD, 1998, p.22) followed in the jurisdiction. The OECD (1998) claims that the lack of transparency implies that other governments don’t have the opportunity to obtain information on how the laws in the jurisdiction are enforced. Once this is prevented by a jurisdiction, the lack of transparency is present. OECD (1998, p.27) lists four key factors to identify harmful preferential tax regimes: 1. No or low effective tax rates 2. “Ring fencing” of regimes

Lack of transparency. Criterion 5 in assessing the harmfulness of favorable tax regimes relates to transparency. The criterion of transparency aims to promote equality between taxpayers in similar situations. Thus, a lack of transparency is a serious indicator of harmful tax competition.341 The importance of this criterion has been explained in two ways. First, a lack of transparency can occur because of unpublished or secret rulings.342 Second, a lack of transparency may result from administrative practices that go beyond the interpretation of tax legislation and exercise discretion in tax treatment in favor of certain taxpayers or certain transactions.343 Tax burden negotiability, lax recovery, and relaxation of the legal provisions at the administrative level in a non-transparent way also leads to a lack of transparency.344 In brief, lack of transparency includes tax measures that are not transparent, as well as non-transparent administrative relaxation of legal provisions in favor of a particular taxpayer. The COCG Agreed Guidance states that a measure is prima facie not transparent if the details of its existence, scope, and conditions are not published.345 The COCG has provided 339 COCG assessment of Italy IT019 (n 296) p. 23. 340 COCG assessment of Morocco MA004 (n 286) 4; COCG assessment of Morocco MA005 (n 286) p. 4. 341 EU Com. Communication on a fair and efficient Corporate Tax System (n 254) p. 12; Boulogne (n 67) p. 53. 342 Pinto, Tax competition (n 117) p. 162. 343 Ibid. 344 EU Code of Conduct (n 241) C 2/3; ▇▇▇▇▇▇ and Wattel (n 246) 933. 345 COCG Agreed Guidance (n 261) p. 8. some guidance to improve transparency and ensure compliance with criterion 5. An example of such guidance is the incorporation of tax rulings in public legislation or public administration guidelines.346 The procedures and conditions underlying rulings should also be embedded in a transparent, i.e. publicly accessible, legal, and administrative framework.347 If it is a ruling that may have horizontal application, it should be published or reflected in a guidance document or otherwise made publicly available.348 In addition, the COCG emphasized in several assessments that, for a measure to be transparent, all preconditions thereto pertaining must be clearly set out in publicly available laws, decrees, regulations, or the like.349 For example, in applying the transparency criterion, the COCG assessed Costa Rica’s manufacturing activities under the Free Zones regime and concluded that the measu...

Lack of transparency. The TPP encroaches on a broad range of issues—the environment, labor and jobs, food, health, access to medicines, and more. Despite the huge impact that the TPP would have on our lives, trade negotiators are developing TPP texts, or chapters, behind closed doors with very little public input. None of the texts are public, though a few have leaked. Moreover, nearly the only people apart from select TPP government officials with access to texts are more than 600 corporate representatives who serve as "official U.S. trade advisors." The text of the TPP must be released now so that we can have a real conversation about the effects of this pact on communities and the environment. The chapters in trade deals devoted to the environment have a history of lacking meaningful enforcement. But they've been strengthened over the years, largely thanks to citizen-led advocacy by groups including the Sierra Club. This pressure led to the forging of a bipartisan consensus in May 2007 that set the minimum standards for environment, labor, and other provisions in our trade agreements. It is essential that the environment chapter of the TPP build on this progress. At the minimum, the environment chapter of the TPP must:  be binding and subject to the same dispute settlement provisions as commercial chapters;  ensure that countries uphold and strengthen their domestic environmental laws and policies and their obligations under multilateral environmental agreements; and  include binding provisions to address the core environment and conservation challenges of the Pacific Rim region, such as a prohibition on trade in illegally taken timber, wildlife, and fish and a ban on shark finning and associated trade.