FACTUAL STATEMENT Sample Clauses

FACTUAL STATEMENT. 2H Offshore’s seven apparent violations of the CACR involved misconduct by a former 2H Offshore Engineering Ltd. Global Director (the “Global Director”) whose oversight responsibilities included 2H KL, and 2H KL’s Technical Director (the “Technical Director”) who had oversight of the day-to-day operations of 2H KL. 2H KL’s work for Petronas involved the drafting of reports, and the Technical Director presenting a workshop in Cuba in regard to Petronas’ drilling of the Catoche-1 oil well in Cuban territorial waters. Petronas and Repsol were jointly operating the Scarabeo 9 Frigstad D90 semi- submersible drilling rig. 2H KL’s work for Repsol involved the issuance of reports in regard to Repsol’s drilling of the Jaguey-1, Yari-1, and Tayno-1 oil ▇▇▇▇▇ in Cuban territorial waters. On November 13, 2008, the Technical Director asked the Global Director for guidance regarding a prior email he received from 2H Brazil’s director about the Catoche-1 oil well drilling project in Cuban waters that advised against engaging in any business involving Cuba because 2H Offshore was an American-owned company. The Global Director responded by forwarding an October 2007 memorandum from Acteon that specifically prohibited work or trade in Cuba even through third countries with the added statement that he did not want to turn away work from Petronas for a reason he was not sympathetic to. The Global Director advised finding a way around Acteon’s prohibition on any work involving Cuba. On the same day, the Global Director emailed 2H Offshore’s then-Managing Director and who advised that approval should be sought from Acteon’s then-Group Finance Director (the “Finance Director”). The Global Director contacted the Finance Director the next day asking for approval to work on Petronas’ project for Repsol. The ensuing conversation clearly stated the drilling activity would be conducted in Cuba. The Finance Director later responded to the Global Director and 2H Offshore’s Managing Director and stated Acteon’s prior U.S. person investor-parent had approved the work on the basis of the information provided by the Global Director with the conditions the report be marked confidential and not provided to anyone else.

FACTUAL STATEMENT. This Factual Statement is made pursuant to, and is part of, the Deferred Prosecution Agreement (“DPA”) dated September 7th, 2021, between the United States Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia, the United States Department of Justice, National Security Division (collectively, “DOJ”) and ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇, ▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇ and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ▇▇▇▇▇▇▇ (collectively, “Defendants”).1 Defendants agree and stipulate that, in the event DOJ brings a deferred prosecution pursuant to the DPA (the “prosecution”): the information in this Factual Statement is true and accurate; this Factual Statement is admissible for all purposes related to the prosecution; and they will neither contest the admissibility of, nor contradict any factual assertions contained in, this Factual Statement. The parties further agree that, although each defendant individually may not have contemporaneously known all of the facts and events described in this Factual Statement, the Factual Statement correctly describes the facts and events described herein, and that the facts and events discussed in this Factual Statement occurred on or about the dates described. 1 Unless stated otherwise, the phrase “Defendants” refers to and includes all three Defendants.

FACTUAL STATEMENT. Internal correspondence disclosed by Keysight shows that prior to acquisition, Anite had business with Sudan, Syria, and Iran, particularly for the benefit of the South African Prior to its acquisition by Keysight, Anite communicated that it would cease all existing and future business with Sudan, Syria, and Iran. Approximately one month after acquiring Anite, on or about September 14, 2015, Keysight informed Anite that sales to Sudan, Syria, and Iran should no longer occur. Keysight thereafter reiterated its instructions to Anite regarding the prohibitions on unauthorized trade with Sudan, Syria and Iran. ector for the Middle East ice President EMEA passed in the U.A.E. egional Director ME and two other employees in the Anite Middle East office I need to advice [sic] you NOT to sell into any of In his email to the three Anite Middle East employees, the Vice President EMEA copied the Later that same day, the Regional Director ME responded to the Vice President EMEA in an email copying two of his colleagues ongoing Iranian business. The Regional Director suggested his resistance to the idea of terminating sales in Iran and with other U.S.-sanctioned countries. Evidence of this resistance continued over text message later that same evening in an exchange between the Regional Director ME and the other two employees that were copied to the reply email to the Vice President EMEA. In the text message exchange, the Regional Director ME and his two colleagues agreed that to preserve their credibility in the local market, they would by ensuring that no mention of Iran or locations in Iran would appear in correspondence. employees were not always successful in preventing mentions of Iran in their correspondence. On January 12, 2016, sent an email to the Vice President EMEA and the Regional Director ME regarding the negotiation of a sale between Anite and a Pakistani telecommunications company, and mentioned that the Pakistani company about [the] . . . Iran Pricing providing for its products. all country names. Less than two hours after receiving the email, the Regional Director ME and the business partner who sent the email exchanged communications via text message and noted they should not mention Iran in their emails and have references to Iran deleted. The Regional Director ME also expressed fear that he would lose his job or end up in jail. In his next email reply to the message regarding the Pakistani negotiations, the Regional Director ME changed the reference...

FACTUAL STATEMENT. Claimant’s wage statements identify “GD Information Technology, Inc.,” a nonexistent entity, as his employer. However, based on the employment policies, practices and procedures applicable throughout Claimant’s employment, Claimant has been employed by General Dynamics Corporation, General Dynamics Information Technology, Inc. and National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (dba General Dynamics NAASCO). Claimant worked as a Maintenance Technician, and later a Maintenance Worker, a non-exempt, hourly position, from approximately 2016 and continuing through June 2019. Defendants have violated and are liable pursuant to, among other laws and regulations, California Labor Code sections 201-204, 210, 226, 226.3, 226.7, 246, 510, 511, 512, 512, 516, 558, 1174, 1174.5, 1175, 1194, 1194.2, 1197, and 1198 as follows: Defendants pay Claimant a lump sum payment of around $290 each pay period. The payment varies based on unidentified factors and is purportedly provided as cash in lieu of benefits. This payment is listed as “HEALTH WELF BENEFT” on Claimant’s wage statements. Claimant believes he receives this payment because he opted out of Defendants’ company-provided health insurance and other benefit coverage. Claimant believes Defendants pay the “HEALTH WELF BENEFT” to other similarly-aggrieved employees. Claimant further alleges Defendants may provide other cash in lieu of benefits payments to employees which may bear the same or different description on each aggrieved employee’s wage statement. All employees of Defendants that receive any cash in lieu of benefits payment including, but not limited to, the “HEALTH WELF BENEFT” are similarly- aggrieved employees to the extent those benefits were not included in each employee’s regular rate of pay for purposes of overtime wages, meal and rest period premium wages, and any other wages or sums based on the regular rate of pay. Claimant also receives a nominal “LTD CREDIT,” described as a “Taxable Fringe Benefit” on his wage statements. Like the “HEALTH WELF BENEFT,” the “LTD CREDIT” is not included in his regular rate of pay for purposes of overtime wages, meal and rest period premium wages, and any other wages based on the regular rate of pay. The “LTD CREDIT” is another example of remuneration Defendants do not include in Claimant’s regular rate of pay. In pay periods Claimant worked overtime or earns meal and rest period premium pay, Defendants’ calculated and paid Claimant based only on his hourly straight time rate,...

FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. Following a request for information from OFAC, Clearstream met with OFAC in late 2007 and early 2008 to discuss accounts it maintained in Luxembourg for Iranian entities. One such account was ultimately identified as an account for the Central Bank of Iran (“CBI”). 4. Securities entitlements held in the CBI’s account at Clearstream at that time included entitlements related to securities held in the United States. Specifically, Clearstream held interests in 26 corporate and sovereign bonds in its omnibus account at a U.S. financial institution in New York in which the CBI had a beneficial ownership interest, with a total nominal value of $2.813 billion. Central securities depositories in the United States served as the ultimate place of safekeeping for these securities. 5. Clearstream, as intermediary, exported custody and related services from the United States to the CBI with respect to the 26 securities described above. Clearstream served as the channel through which the CBI was able to hold an interest in these securities, as well as to transfer or sell those interests at a later date. 6. During its initial meeting with OFAC in December 2007, Clearstream stated that its Executive Board made the decision in October 2007 to close all accounts that it maintained for Iranian customers, regardless of whether such accounts involved securities held in custody in the United States. Clearstream indicated, however, that its Iranian customers were experiencing difficulties selling their securities entitlements or finding other financial institutions willing to take Clearstream’s place as custodian. Clearstream and OFAC discussed the risk posed by holding in the United States assets in which Iranian customers had an interest. In communications in early 2008, OFAC and Clearstream discussed the manner in which Clearstream would wind down its Iranian business to achieve the institution’s stated objective of terminating its Iranian business. 7. Between February 7, 2008, and February 29, 2008, Clearstream, acting on instructions from the CBI, transferred the aforementioned 26 securities entitlements from the CBI’s account at Clearstream to a recently-opened custody account for a European commercial bank at Clearstream. The European bank maintained two accounts at Clearstream – a proprietary account opened in the 1970s to hold its own assets, and a “customers” account that the bank opened in January 2008, just prior to the transfer of the 26 securities entitlements, ...

FACTUAL STATEMENT. Zoltek U.S. is an industrial equipment and services company founded in 1975 and located in Missouri. Zoltek, a holding company also based in Missouri and founded in 1983, is the parent of Zoltek U.S. and ▇▇▇▇▇▇ ZRT, a Hungarian producer of acrylic and other fibers. Zoltek maintains manufacturing operations throughout the United States, Hungary, and Mexico, and is primarily engaged in the manufacturing and sale of carbon fiber, a material used in a variety of industrial and commercial capacities. Zoltek ZRT purchases a large volume of acrylonitrile (“ACN”), the principal component used to make carbon fiber. Throughout the time period described in this Agreement, Zoltek ZRT generally purchased ACN from one of four third-country suppliers: (i) an entity located in the Netherlands; (ii) an entity located in Switzerland; (iii) an entity located in Russia; and (iv) OJSC Polymir (“Polymir”) located in Belarus. Zoltek ZRT procured ACN directly from these companies in “spot” purchases — one-time purchases for which Zoltek ZRT would collect several bids from several suppliers before making a final decision, or indirectly from these same suppliers through third-party trading companies. ▇▇▇▇▇▇’▇ procurement and approval process as it related to Zoltek ZRT’s acquisition of ACN occurred as follows: 1. First, the Zoltek ZRT Purchasing and Logistics Manager collected offers from potential suppliers by contacting them directly or soliciting bids at auctions or through third-party trading companies; 2. After collecting these offers, the Zoltek ZRT Purchasing and Logistics Manager sent recommendation to the General Manager of Zoltek ZRT; 3. Next, the General Manager of Zoltek ZRT forwarded the recommendation to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Zoltek U.S. for the CEO’s approval. Beginning in or around June 2014, the Executive Vice President for Production and Technology (EVPPT) of Zoltek U.S. assumed the responsibility of approving these orders. Other senior-level managers within Zoltek U.S. were occasionally consulted during this approval process, specifically including the Chief Operating Officer (COO) and the Chief Financial Officer (CFO).

FACTUAL STATEMENT. 3. In January 2001, HBEU approached HBUS with a proposal to clear U.S. dollar transactions for Bank Melli London (“Bank Melli”) through HBEU’s correspondent account with HBUS by utilizing Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication (“SWIFT”) MT 202 cover payments that would not reference Bank Melli. In February 2001, HBUS concluded that the proposed transactions appeared to comply with OFAC regulations that authorized U.S. depository institutions to process certain transactions for the direct or indirect benefit of persons in Iran or the Government of Iran where the transactions involved transfers from one third country’s account at a domestic bank to another third country’s account at a domestic bank (“U-turn” transactions). A June 2001 email from an HBEU relationship manager to members of HBUS Compliance stated: Once the proposition goes live we have instructed Bank Melli to alter the format of [its] payments to achieve straight through [processing]… we have further asked them to only put ‘One of our clients’ in field 52, thus removing the chance of them inputting an ‘Iranian referenced’ customer name, that causes fall out of the cover payment sent to HBUS and a breach of OFAC regulations. 4. In a letter drafted in April 2001, an HBEU Business Development Manager explained to Bank Melli how to send payments to HBEU in a manner that would allow HBEU to process its payments successfully through HBUS. The key is to always populate field 52… this means that the outgoing payment instruction from HSBC will not quote “Bank Melli” as sender – just HSBC London and whatever is in field 52. This then negates the need to quote “DO NOT MENTION OUR NAME IN NEW YORK” in field 72 (emphasis in original). 5. By July 2001, several HBUS compliance, payments, and business managers, as well as HSBC Group’s Compliance head,1 were aware that HBEU was discussing with Bank Melli how to structure Iranian-related payments to be processed through HBUS. Although HBUS’ head of Compliance warned HSBC Group’s head of Compliance that OFAC might view HBEU’s formatting instructions to Bank Melli as a willful disregard or evasion of U.S. sanctions, and that the non-transparent nature of the payment messages could make it impossible for either HBEU or HBUS to confirm that any payment would be permissible, neither HSBC Group nor HBEU implemented processes to ensure the Bank Melli payments processed to or through HBUS were authorized or exempt pursuant to U.S. sanctions regulat...

FACTUAL STATEMENT. During the relevant time period, Essentra FZE maintained accounts at the foreign branch of a U.S. financial institution located in Dubai, UAE into which three wire transfers associated with the Apparent Violations were deposited. 1 Pursuant to § 510.326 of the NKSR, a foreign branch of any entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States is a U.S. person subject to the prohibitions of the NKSR.

FACTUAL STATEMENT. On or about February 12, 2014, EF Data and Memotec prepared a price quote for satellite equipment under warranty, ongoing telephone support, and technical training for a Canadian Company that develops and manufactures satellite communications equipment. An April 30, 2014 sales document issued by EF Data identified the destination of the equipment as Sudan. On May 21, 2014, EF Data’s Credit Manager received a letter of credit indicating that Sudan was the final destination for the goods. EF Data’s Credit Manager responded to the letter of credit via email by stating, “I have reviewed the attached [Letter of Credit] and have several questions. What is the ultimate destination of this order? From the statement on page 5, it appears that it is Sudan. If so, we may have export issues with this.” This email to the Canadian Company also copied (1) EF Data’s then Director of Sales for Canada and the United States,